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This thesis departs from political economic explanations of  global city making, 
proposing that social scientists adopt an institutionalist perspective to make sense of 
the current phase of  global city development, characterized by policy concerns with 
consumption and lifestyle. Using the concept of  city making as a broad label for 
organized activities that shape cities, I argue that city making has undergone a 
qualitative shift in the last few decades, driven by two interrelated trends, the 
proliferation of  diverse formal organizations and the rise of  the global middle class. 
While organizational interests are diverse and not necessarily economically driven, 
they converge on the global middle class as a major reference point. The global 
middle class enters into city making in two ways, 1) acting as a “constituted actor,” 
framed by marketing, media and market research organizations that observe the rise 
of  the global middle class consumer through their data and reports; 2) as professional 
experts – including obvious ones such as policymakers, architects, urban planners, 
scientists, but also less obvious ones, such as journalists, market researchers, business 
executives, social activists – who occupy professional roles at organizations which 
contribute to the rationalization of  city visions. The result is an emergent global field 
of  organized city making, which is constituted around the rationalization of  models 
of  how cities ought to be in an age of  global modernity. By focusing on the role of 
the global middle class as a major reference point for city making, this work aims to 
expand the notion of  city making beyond the traditional focus on economic processes 
and economic actors in shaping cities.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION:  
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION OF CITIES 
Two hundred forty-three million Americans crowd together in the 3 percent 
of the country that is urban. Thirty-six million people live in an around 
Tokyo, the most productive metropolitan area in the world. Twelve million 
people reside in central Mumbai, and Shanghai is almost as large. On a 
planet with vast amounts of space, we choose cities. Although it has become 
cheaper to travel long distances, or to telecommute from the Ozarks to 
Azerbaijan, more and more people are clustering closer and closer together in 
large metropolitan areas... Despite the technological breakthroughs that have 
caused the death of distance, it turns out that the world isn‟t flat; it‟s paved… 
The city has triumphed. 
(Glaeser 2011:1-2, Triumph of the City, 
New York Times bestseller) 
“The city has triumphed,” declares urban economist Edward Glaeser in his 
New York Times bestseller, celebrating the well-known fact that the contemporary age 
is an age of  cities. Taken at face value, the meaning of  this statement is simply that 
the number of  people living in cities is unprecedented. In 1950, 730 million people – 
or a little under 30% of  the world population – was classified as urban, and the 
developed west accounted for close to 60% of  this share. By 2011, the world urban 
population had increased nearly fivefold to 3.63 billion people, 52% of  the world 
population (UN-DESA 2012; see Table 1.1). But beyond the obvious fact that more 
people than ever before are living in cities, there are also substantial qualitative, 
fundamental changes which Glaeser is alluding to. Hall et al. (2008) go so far as to 
claim that we are witnessing the “Third Urban Revolution1.” What sets the current 
                                                   
1 In Hall et. al (2008)‟s usage, the first urban revolution refers to the Neolithic revolution, which gave birth to 




phase of  urbanization apart from previous urban revolutions are the scale of  change, 
the emergence of  megacities and massive metropolitan areas, its global, post-western, 
poly-centric nature, and the rescaling of  cities vis-à-vis nation-states (Hall et al. 
2008:6-8).  
 
Table 1.1: World total, urban and rural populations, 1950-2050 (projected) 
        Population (billion) 
Development group     1950 1970 2011 2030 2050 
         Total population 
       World…………………………………...……. 2.53 3.70 6.97 8.32 9.31 
     More developed regions…………………. 0.81 1.01 1.24 1.30 1.31 
     Less developed regions…………………... 1.72 2.69 5.73 7.03 7.99 
         Urban population 
       World…………………………………...……. 0.75 1.35 3.63 4.98 6.25 
     More developed regions…………………. 0.44 0.67 0.96 1.06 1.13 
     Less developed regions…………………... 0.30 0.68 2.67 3.92 5.12 
         Rural population 
       World…………………………………...……. 1.79 2.34 3.34 3.34 3.05 
     More developed regions…………………. 0.37 0.34 0.28 0.23 0.18 
     Less developed regions…………………... 1.42 2.01 3.07 3.11 2.87 
                  
(Source: UN-DESA, 2012:4) 
The rapid growth in urban population has not been evenly distributed across 
the world. Rather, the current state of  the world population is characterized by the 
agglomeration of  large populations into vast megacity regions, defined as 
metropolitan regions with 10 million inhabitants or more. In 1970, there were only 
two megacity regions in the world, Tokyo and New York. By 1990, there were ten, 
and by 2011, this number had doubled to 23. From 1970 to 2011, the number of  
people living in megacities increased nearly tenfold from 39.5 million to 359.4 
million. Most of  these megacities are located in Asia, and projections indicate a 
“clear trend of  accelerated urban concentration in Asia (UN-DESA 2012:6, also see 
table 1.2). These trends even point, tentatively, to the formation of  mega-
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metropolitan regions, such as the one encompassing Hong Kong, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Macau, resulting in spatial formations that challenge our 
understanding of  cities as bounded territorial entities (Castells 2010). While 
population size is a relatively crude indicator of  urbanization, the figures do make the 
point that unlike the previous wave of urbanization in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, where most of the urbanization was concentrated in Western 
Europe and America, the current wave of urbanization – while concentrated in Asia 
– is post-western and poly-centric. In this sense, the current phase of urbanization is a 
truly global phenomenon.  
Table 1.2: Megacities, 1970-2011 (pop. in millions) 
 1970      2011   
Rank Urban agglomeration Pop.  Rank Urban agglomeration Pop. 
1 Tokyo, Japan 23.3  1 Tokyo, Japan 37.2 
2 New York-Newark, USA 16.2  2 Delhi, India 22.7 
     3 Mexico City, Mexcio 20.4 
     4 New York-Newark, USA 20.4 
  1990    5 Shanghai, China 20.2 
Rank Urban agglomeration Pop.  6 São Paulo, Brazil 19.9 
1 Tokyo, Japan 32.5  7 Mumbai, India 19.7 
2 New York-Newark, USA 16.1  8 Beijing, China 15.6 
3 Mexico City, Mexico 15.3  9 Dhaka, Bangledesh 15.4 
4 São Paulo, Brazil 14.8  10 Kolkata, India 14.4 
5 Mumbai, India 12.4  11 Karachi, Pakistan 13.9 
6 Osaka-Kobe, Japan 11.0  12 Buenos Aires, Argentina 13.5 
7 Kolkata, India 10.9  13 LA-Long Beach-Santa Ana, 
USA 
13.4 
8 LA-Long Beach-Santa Ana, 
USA 
10.9  14 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 12.0 
9 Seoul, Republic of Korea 10.5  15 Manila, Philippines 11.9 
10 Buenos Aires, Argentina 10.5  16 Moscow, Russian 
Federation 
11.6 
     17 Osaka-Kobe, Japan 11.5 
     18 Istanbul, Turkey 11.3 
     19 Lagos, Nigeria 11.2 
     20 Cairo, Egypt 11.2 
     21 Guangzhou, Guangdong, 
China 
10.8 
     22 Shenzhen, China 10.6 
     23 Paris, France 10.6 
(Source: UN-DESA, 2012:6) 
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On a deeper level, what makes the current phase of  urbanization “global,” is 
the fact that at the core of  this new spatial formation is a growing number of  what 
can be called global cities. Ever since Saskia Sassen‟s (1991, 2001) work on New 
York, London and Tokyo as production, innovation and market centres of  global 
financial and advanced producer services, the imaginary of  the global city has spread 
beyond academia and become ubiquitous in popular usage, especially within the 
realms of  business and policy. Yet, even before the popularization of  the term, almost 
half  a century ago, Peter Hall (1966) had already described a global network of  cities 
within which a few cities were rising to international importance, becoming the 
centres of  political, financial, medical, legal, higher educational, scientific, and mass 
media organizations. Today, we can see the results of  these trends – the formation of  
global cities which are connected through organizational linkages, communications 
and transport technologies, in a spatial articulation of  a global urban network (Taylor 
2004).  
Global cities are considered to be global for a few reasons. First, global cities 
share institutional characteristics that transcend traditional notions of  territoriality 
and national cultures. Second, they are connected with each other through 
organizational, communication and transportation links. Third, they are also global 
in the sense of  having relevance for other cities, even for those do not particularly 
aspire towards the top of the urban hierarchy. Global cities are not simply centralized 
sites for coordinating global capital and production; neither are they simply 
concentrated centres of  work and production. They are also centres of  consumption, 
leisure, and lifestyle pursuits. Many people in such cities share similar consumption 
activities, or at the least, aspire towards such an urban, modern lifestyle. They not 
only share a common urban habitat, but perhaps, as importantly, share similar levels 
of  formal education, work, lifestyles, values, and are exposed to globally produced 
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media content and consumer goods. And thus, global cities are also global in the 
sense of  producing a global lifestyle – and providing the resources for living it – that 
transcends narrowly defined ethno-nationalistic ways of  life. 
One observable indicator of  the convergence in urban lifestyles is the uplifting 
of  many old city centres and neighbourhoods across the world, where former 
industrial spaces have been transformed into loft apartments, fashionable boutique 
hotels, shops, restaurants, pubs, museums, and other similar spaces of  consumption 
(Zukin 1998). This phenomenon, first observed in inner London and given the label 
“gentrification” by the sociologist Ruth Glass, has now been observed to varying 
degrees in major global cities around the world, constituting a generalized global 
phenomenon (Smith 2002). A generalized uplifting of  cities on an even more 
massive, organized scale is the sprouting up in major cities of  “grand projects” and 
“flagships”, which includes the construction of  new cultural attractions or by hosting 
major events and festivals (Smith 2007). Many of  these projects are based on 
spectacular architecture, and has today been dubbed the Bilbao effect, named after 
the Guggenheim museum in the city of  Bilbao, Spain. The museum was designed 
and built for its “wow factor”, in order to promote tourism to the city. Closely related 
to this is the striking parallel, global re-development of  former docks, ports and 
waterfronts, modeled after the success of  the “Central Waterfront” model that was 
formulated in the USA during the 1970s – exemplified by the now famous 
“Baltimore model”, which, in the aftermath of  its success, quickly spread to the UK 
and other western cities (Smith and Ferrari 2012, Jones 2007, Ward 2006). Yet, 
beyond worn and inaccurate notions of  such strategies being limited to western cities, 
it is clear that such waterfront urban redevelopment have spread to Asia as well, 
especially in port cities like Dubai, Hong Kong, Mumbai, Shanghai Singapore and 
Tokyo (Giblett and Samant 2012). The Marina Bay Sands complex in Singapore is a 
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striking example that encapsulates all these separate observations. It not only 
combines spectacular architecture with consumption – housing a shopping mall, 
casino, theatre, and hotel all within the same integrated complex – and waterfront 
development, but also demonstrates the diffusion of  such strategies beyond the west.  
Some scholars even go so far to argue that all of  this constitutes the 
emergence of  the postmodern city, to be distinguished from modern cities. The 
implication is that modern cities are cities of  industrial production, and postmodern 
cities are hedonistic cities of  pleasure, leisure, entertainment, and consumption 
(Hannigan 1998, Zukin 1998, Clarke 1997). In a crude sense, “postmodern cities are 
cities of  consumption, rather than of  production; cities of  the shopping mall rather 
than of  the factory” (Glennie 1998:927). From a spatial perspective, the postmodern 
city is set apart from the modern city by the clustering of  leisure amenities, 
waterfront regeneration, and a general emergence of  mixed-used urban clusters that 
are “characterized by a mixture of  distinctive avant-garde design schemes and 
heritage buildings” (Gospodini 2006:314). These developments are so similar and 
homogenized across much of  the world that they have drawn criticism from 
architectural critics and scholars and alike for being inauthentic and “placeless”, or 
more crudely, engendering in users that “could-be-anywhere” sense of  space (Smith 
2007, Miles 2010). 
This dissertation developed out of  an attempt to make sense of  these urban 
transformations. Specifically, I deal with the common assertion that contemporary 
cities are defined and driven by consumption, leisure, and lifestyle. What does this 
notion really mean? Does it have any conceptual or empirical purchase? And how 
does this relate to the current phase of  urbanization and emergence of  global cities, 
and more broadly, to the specific character of  our times? These are the questions I 
deal with in this work. 
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1.1. The Third Urban Revolution 
It is easy to see the abovementioned changes simply as logical extensions of  
the tendency for cities to develop consumer cultures. While consumerism and 
consumer culture is often thought of  as a twentieth century development, historically, 
by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, towns and cities of  the Eurasian continent 
were already market centres of  a vast merchant network, where goods and services 
were traded and consumed (Braudel 2000[1979]:479-588, Goody 2008[2004]:126-
160). Other scholars have also noted the flourishing of  consumer goods, fashion, and 
the arts – hallmarks of  consumer culture – in seventeenth to eighteenth century 
Europe, as well as in the cities of  Ming China and Tokugawa Japan (Clunas 2012, 
Trentmann 2009, Featherstone 2007). Urban environments have also historically been 
the contexts of  the learning and practice of  consumption, through participation in 
dense interactional communities, utilizing various sorts of  urban spaces such as fairs, 
markets, and so on (Glennie and Thrift 1992). Cities have also been places where new 
retail formats and new ways to consume were invented. The department store, for 
example, was invented in the nineteenth century in Europe, US, and Japan. It was a 
physical embodiment of  democratized luxury, since shoppers were able to walk 
through stores without necessarily buying anything, and these innovations helped 
institutionalize a nascent consumer culture (Tamari 2006, Laermans 1993, Williams 
1982). Thus, the availability of  avenues for consumption has, at least since the early 
modern period, been one of  the defining hallmarks of  cities, and thus, the expansion 
of  such avenues in cities today does represent a historical continuity with previous 
forms of  urban consumption. Nevertheless, the evidence that I have presented above 
points at the qualitative newness of  some of  the features – including that of  urban 
consumption – we now routinely associate with globally modern cities.  
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For one, much of  the social change in the last twenty to thirty years – which 
has proceeded at staggering speed and magnitude – are spatially centred in cities. In 
this sense, urbanization and globalization are simply two sides of  the same coin, and 
these two terms merely reflect the growth of  cities as spatial embodiments of  nodes 
in the flows of  people, capital, goods, and culture. This means going beyond 
understanding urbanization simply as the growth of  absolute and relative urban 
populations, to seeing urbanization as an intensification of  these different types of  
connectivity, mobility and communication (Taylor 2004).  This massive urbanization 
of  the world is significant for a few reasons. First, it creates developmental problems 
for transnational organizations like the United Nations, governments, NGOs, and so 
on. Since cities, as physical entities, consume a lot of  energy and produce vast 
amounts of  waste, one can imagine that issues of  urban sustainability will become 
more important as cities increase in population, geographical size and build more 
modern infrastructure.  
But beyond all of  these valid, practical concerns, the rapid urbanization of  the 
world also has deeper sociological implications. First, the built environment of  most 
modern cities, but especially salient in global cities – skyscrapers, monuments, bus 
and subway systems capable of  transporting millions of  passengers a day, and other 
physical infrastructure – stand as material symbols of  modernity and act as a major 
source of  reference for cities around the world. Second, as sites of  concentrated 
connectivity and mobility, cities provide radically new ways and opportunities of 
being individuals. Georg Simmel (2002[1903]), in his famous essay, Metropolis and 
Mental Life, noted the anonymity, fleeting encounters, and ceaseless stimulation 
afforded by metropolitan Berlin that gave rise to new possibilities of  fashion, 
interaction and movement. In a similar fashion, drawing on the work of  the 
modernist poet, Charles Baudelaire, cultural critic Walter Benjamin described the 
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ephemerality of  urban experience, encapsulated in the flâneur – the wanderer who 
was most at home navigating through and observing urban life, simultaneously 
adopting a detached and involved attitude in the process (cited in Featherstone 
2007:69-72).  
Today, even an activity as mundane as walking around in a city is construed 
as the individualized and agentic consumption of  urban experience (de Certeau 
1984). The possibilities for interaction are reinforced by the numerous amenities 
available to city users, such as restaurants, pubs, cafes, museums, movie theatres, 
urban parks and so on. Furthermore, as places where modern retailers – ranging from 
convenience stores to massive shopping malls and mega-marts – are to be found in 
dense concentration, cities also provide its many inhabitants access to globally 
produced consumer goods, which are themselves signifiers of  a modern and urban 
lifestyle. With more than half  of  the world population now living in urban areas, 
urbanization is bringing more people in touch with the symbols of  (urban) modernity 
than ever before. Yet, they are not passive consumers of  modernity, but rather, active 
participants in the modern condition. Since cities are also sites of  institutional, 
cultural and technological innovation, they are also, by implication, places where the 
project of  modernity is enacted and played out. This happens chiefly via specialized 
organizations such as corporations, states and NGOs, research centres and 
universities, as well as looser interactional urban communities based on common 
values and interests. For these reasons, many of  these organizational and individual 
actors will be involved in re-defining a post-western, poly-centric, global modernity.  
Finally, the current phase of  urban development is global in the sense of  being 
transnational, even post-national. Nowhere is this more visible in the proliferation of 
think tanks, global policy networks and similar initiatives dedicated to thinking about 
cities and urban solutions. Many of  these organizations are regional or global, and 
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the increasing capacity of  these specialized organizations which are not necessarily 
extensions of  nation-states increasing problematizes state centred notions of  urban 
planning and governance. Obviously, states, especially developmental states continue 
to play important roles in managing and shaping the cities which are located within 
their territorial boundaries (Hill and Kim 2000, Olds and Yeung 2004). Even so, the 
general trend is towards the increasing significance and importance of  cities in their 
own right, and perhaps even the “the creation of  informal city-states within different 
countries… de facto city-states” (Short 2012:7-8). There are indicators that such 
claims may not be far off. For one, while comparative academic studies still continue 
to be operationalized at the level of  the nation-state, there are signs that a revival of 
comparative urban research is underway (Nijman 2007, Ward 2008). This has also 
been fuelled partly by the growing awareness and critique of  methodological 
nationalism in social science – where the nation-state is taken as the de-facto context 
and boundary of  society for study (Wimmer and Schiller 2002).  
While the concerns of  these organizations are diverse, they share a common 
action-oriented focus on identifying urban problems and prescribing urban solutions. 
Organizations that focus on less developed cities might have to deal with slums, 
pollution, congestion, hygiene and so on, problems that the first industrial cities in 
Europe, struggled to deal with. Then there are organizational networks and initiates 
that aim to provide platforms for urban planners and politicians to share urban best 
practices in developed cities. Some examples include the attempt to generate reliable 
and universally agreed criteria for benchmarking cities. Such widespread discussions 
about how modern cities ought to look like not only circulate at the expert level, but 
also in popular media. Popular articles are devoted to ranking cities with the coolest 
nightlife or best cultural experience. Terms such as creative cities or liveable cities, 
have been popularized by an ever increasing number of  semi-expert and popular city 
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ranking reports. In this sense, what Hall et al. (2008) refer to as the Third Urban 
Revolution is not simply a case of  global urbanization, in numerical terms, of  the 
human population. It also includes a reshaping of  how we understand, think about 
and reflect on cities and their role in society.  
As an illustration, it is often claimed that “postmodern cities are cities of  
consumption, rather than of  production; cities of  the shopping mall rather than of 
the factory” (Glennie 1998:927)2. Part of  this claim has some metaphorical validity, 
especially in cities that have seen the decline of  manufacturing industry and have 
reinvented themselves as postindustrial cities (Bell 1973, Savitch 1998, Miles 2010). 
That cities are centres of consumption is obvious, but what is more interesting is that 
the meaning of  city-ness is increasingly linked to such consumption. I am speaking of a 
general emergence of  what can be referred to as a “dominant global city imaginary,” 
one in which “cultural concerns now play a significant role in urban development 
issues… and where cities are now the stages for the presentation of  culture, leisure, 
cosmopolitanism, and postmodernism” (Short 2012:48). On the level of  urban 
economic policy, we find the increasing acceptance of  the notion that “cities must 
become trendy, happening places in order to compete in the twenty-first-century 
economy” (Malanga 2004).   
1.2. Global city isomorphism: cities of lifestyle and consumption 
The popularity of  Richard Florida‟s (2002) creative city proposals is an 
excellent case in point. In his bestselling book, The Rise of  the Creative Class, Florida 
argues that in a post-industrial world where economic value increasingly stems from 
                                                   
2 This statement needs some qualification, since it is partly a result of a productionist bias in 
sociology and the social sciences more generally, which tends to see the history of modernity as 
being bound up with the rationalization of industrial capitalist production which reached its 
pinnacle in Henry Ford‟s assembly line, while ignoring the concomitant development of 
marketing, advertising and the mass selling of consumer goods (Petrovic and Hamilton 2011). 
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work “whose function is to create meaningful new forms” (Florida 2002:68), cities 
need to attract members of  the creative class to remain economically viable and 
competitive. The core of the creative class, Florida argues, is composed of scientists, 
engineers, architects, designers, educators, artists, musicians and entertainers, and a 
broader group of  roles that includes “creative professionals in business and finance, 
law, health care and related fields” (Florida 2002:8, italics in original). Since creative 
people flock to creative spaces, the argument continues, the logical solution for city 
governments and coalitions seeking to reinvigorate declining cities and revive urban 
economies thus lies in making them into edgy and authentic cities (Florida 2002:215-
234). Cities which successfully manage to present themselves as centres of  creativity 
will be able to attract members of  the creative class to live and work in those cities, 
thus contributing to the economic growth of  those urban centres. In other words, 
cool cities with all sorts of  amenities and lifestyle considerations are talent magnets. 
While the efficacy of  Florida‟s recommendations has come under scrutiny and 
critique, what is undeniable is that Florida‟s recommendations have been considered, 
adopted and implemented to varying degrees in cities as diverse as Singapore, 
Toronto, and Auckland (Peck 2005:742). It is tempting to over-attribute the 
consumerization of  city visions in policy and planning discourse to the widespread 
acceptance of  Richard Florida‟s ideas by urban planners and policy makers (see Peck 
2005). Yet, another way is to see Florida‟s ideas as simply an exemplary case of  a 
more generalized vision of  urban regeneration based on leisure, lifestyle and cultural 
consumption. In other words, “Florida has come along to codify and capture a 
movement already in progress” (Jacobs 2005). 
Indeed, while Florida‟s urban policy recommendations are aimed at 
stimulating localized “authentic neighbourhood” reforms and changes, they also 
exemplify a deeper concern with lifestyle and cultural consumption within global 
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urban policy thinking. The focus on cultural consumption has been scaled up 
globally, with city and national governments embarking on projects of  cultural 
imagineering (Yeoh 2005). This includes the construction of  spectacular flagship 
projects designed by world famous architects, waterfront re-development, place 
promotion and place marketing, investing heavily in the arts, and organizing mega-
events, for the purpose of  projecting images of  global city-ness (Yeoh 2005). 
Furthermore, such policy measures are not limited to developed countries, or so-
called “postindustrial” cities. One indicator of  the institutionalization of  such policy 
notions at the level of  world society is in the fact that the World Bank has in place 
lending programmes to cities in developing countries to restore historic cores for the 
aim of  boosting economic growth (World Bank 2011).  
In summary, one could argue that this lifestyle vision of  the city is one major 
principle in current urban policy considerations: 
[…] the contemporary city is currently defined by a belief in consumption, 
and the current practices and future intentions of urban imagineers, local 
authorities and private-sector producers (financial speculators, architects, 
urban planners and other council officials) disseminate a clear message that it 
is consumption that is set to shape the future of our cities. Consumption has 
become so ingrained in both political and institutional visions, planning and policy 
regimes and our everyday lives that consumption is not simply about goods and 
services but is central to our vision of the city, the very idea of the city. (Jayne 2006:3, 
my italics) 
On a deeper level then, the notion that (post)modern cities are cities of  consumption 
makes sense, if  this is taken to mean that semantics of  modern cities is couched not 
simply in terms of  urban liveability, but also, one that is “firmly linked into the global 
circuits of  culture, taste and aesthetic sensibilities” (Short 2012:49). While the spatial 
actualization of  these visions are not evenly distributed across all cities, the vision of  
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modern cities as exciting, cool and sophisticated places for consumption and lifestyle 
possibilities sets expectations for what globally modern cities ought to look like.  
While some of  these trends I have briefly described can be seen as extensions 
of  long term modernization processes, there are also substantial qualitative 
differences. The absolute growth of  cities in spatial and population terms has been 
staggering, and with the emergence of  mega-cities, many of  them in Asia, the result 
is an unprecedented inclusion of  huge numbers of  people into modernity over a 
relatively compressed scale of  time. The formation of  global cities as centres of  
formal organizations and informal interactions also represent a new way in which 
world society is organized and spatially inscribed. Finally, while intellectuals, 
emperors and kings had various visions of  ideal cities and sought to realize them 
through city projects, the proliferation of  increasingly transnational organizations 
represent radically new scales of  organizing that were not achievable in previous 
epochs. Yet, paradoxically, despite the increasing complexity behind the shaping of 
cities one might expect from the proliferation of  organized actors, there also appears 
to be an integrative, common point of  reference between diverse organizational 
actors.  
What does this all mean? Do all of  these changes point to something new and 
different, and how can scholars make sense of  this? Why is the meaning of  being a 
globally modern city so tied up with lifestyle and consumption? These are broad and 
tentative questions which this work is chiefly concerned with. Obviously, the changes 
I have described have received a lot of  scholarly attention and are more or less treated 
as unproblematic facts in urban studies. As such, this thesis‟ contribution is not to 
provide new empirical data, but rather, to provide a new, theoretically informed 
interpretation of  these observations. Given the voluminous amount of  scholarship on 
urban studies – most of  them based on empirical case studies of  city neighbourhoods, 
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or the different strategies that different actors have taken to regenerate cities and so 
on – one might expect theoretical integration to be a difficult task. After all, urban 
studies deal with actual cities, which, as unique places, resist generalizations and 
theoretical abstractions. This tendency can be traced back to the urban ethnographic 
tradition of  the Chicago school, where Robert Park was quoted to have urged his 
students to “go get the seat of  [their] pants dirty in real research” (cited in Brewer 
2000:13). These case studies, many of  them published in the journal Urban Studies, 
have done much to promote our understanding of  urban transformations in 
individual cities around the world, particularly beyond the west, confirming that we 
are in an age of  global urban change. Against such a presumed uniqueness of  cities, it 
is sociologically fascinating how the processes, visions and strategies of  urban 
regeneration, development, branding, and so on, are quite similar in different regions 
of  the world. This observed similarity, or isomorphism, is what drives this thesis‟ 
attempt at re-interpreting the Third Urban Revolution as a revolution in city making. 
1.3. Theorizing global city isomorphism and urban change 
The concepts of  city making and city makers are concepts respectively 
referring to social action and organized actors that affect and shape cities. More 
commonly, in existing usage, city making is often used to describe policy strategies 
that are adopted by governments interested in making their cities global (for example, 
see Goldman 2011, Segbers 2007). Thus, “global city making” is often discussed in 
terms of  politics and inequality (for example, Lipman 2002). The implication is that 
the governments and politicians make cities through planning, coordination and 
governance, although there can be political resistance from activists and other 
marginalized actors. Others have also referred to the “remaking of  inner cities” by 
the middle class, who physically remake cities through their consumption and 
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lifestyle (Hamnett 2003, Ley 1996). Landry (2006) refers to city making as an art, and 
although he claims that city making should not simply be left to architects, engineers, 
planners, surveyors, and so on, it is clear that his proposals of  creating more organic 
cities are still aimed at those who are thought to matter – politicians and planners.  
In my usage, however, city making is a much broader category, referring to the 
ways in which actors – sometimes individual, but mostly organizational – observe 
and reflect on the meaning of  cities. It involves the articulation of  city visions and the 
institutionalization of  those visions. Although architecture and urban planning 
constitute part of  it, beyond these direct ways whereby the city is imagined, planned, 
designed and then actualized, city making involves broader institutional activities, 
such as research on cities, policy reports about best practices, and so on. Thinking in 
terms of  city making and city makers is an attempt to frame the study of  urban 
change by problematizing issues of  agency, actorhood, and the question of  who 
makes cities.  
In this sense, city makers have existed as long as cities have been around; 
there is nothing particularly new about projects that sought to re-imagine cities and 
re-order city life around them. City projects can be traced all the way back to the 
Greek polis, where philosophers debated what a good and just city might be like. 
More recently, since Paris –arguably the first modern city – transformed itself  from a 
smelly, polluted collection of  slums into the city of  wide boulevards and fancy 
shopping arcades and set itself  as the standard for other cities to emulate, 
intellectuals, architects and planners have sought to imagine what cities could be. 
Intellectuals have historically been fascinated by the city life that surrounded them, 
and often celebrated urban modernity, even if  they were less approving of  the more 
negative aspects of  it. Even Marx and Engels, who were appalled at the conditions of 
the urban slums of England – which had developed as a result of dispossessed 
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peasants moving to the cities as proletarians – wrote in The Communist Manifesto that 
the excitement of city life was much preferable to the “idiocy of  rural life” (Marx and 
Engels 2010:392). 
Yet, given the scale and speed of  urban transformation in the last thirty to 
forty years or so, there is evidence to suspect that there has been a qualitative change 
in city making over the same period. Indeed, this is constantly hinted at in the urban 
studies literature. As I briefly review in Chapter Two, questions of  urban change – I 
examine the gentrification and global city literatures – have by and large been tied to 
the problem of  agency, i.e. who is gentrifying cities, or who is driving global city 
formation, and so on. The scholarly literature has continually been revised to expand 
city making and city makers – from middle class individuals to real estate developers, 
municipal governments and entire states. Scholars are also paying increasing 
attention to the role of  urban policy transfer, global networks and formal organizing. 
Even so, city making has mostly been approached from either side of  the 
production/economy and consumption/culture dichotomy. Generally speaking, in 
the latter, urban change is primarily driven by capitalists seeking to commodify the 
city, or otherwise by neoliberal alliances between state and capital, and the 
consumers of  the city are often the very agents of  transnational capital. For that 
reason, political and financial elites feature prominently in this account. In this 
understanding, corporations and states are the main city makers. On the other hand, 
a consumption/culture explanation relies on the postindustrial thesis, with its focus 
on the emergence of  a new class of  professionals who subscribe to a liberal ideology 
and indulgence for urban lifestyles and consumerism. Yet, as I will go into further 
detail in the next chapter, both of  these arguments are rooted in a more generalized 
economistic and productionist imagery of  social change – which I refer to as the 
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political economy perspective – itself  embedded in the broader narrative of  the 
history of  modernity (Jepperson and Meyer 2007).  
I depart from accounts of  city making that focus solely on capitalists and 
global elites, arguing that city makers are not simply capitalist individuals, firms, 
states, or neoliberal capital-state alliances, and they need not necessarily operate with 
economic or political motives only. Their visions cannot be reduced to neoliberal 
visions of  global capitalism. Instead, I propose focusing on the rise of  the global 
middle class as a key frame of  reference and vehicle for understanding contemporary 
city making3. In Chapter Three, I elaborate in more specific terms what I mean by the 
global middle class. In my usage, the global middle class has two roles: first, it acts as 
an institutionalized demand for certain types of  cities; second, a proportion of  the 
global middle class act as experts, studying, observing, classifying, ranking, and 
proposing generalized urban solutions. In particular, I focus on the lifestyle and 
consumer role played by the global middle class as a constituted actor, before 
focusing on their role as profession experts in Chapter Four. I show that the rise of  
urban experts have greatly contributed to the rationalization of  city making, where 
city visions are articulated in accordance with scientized scripts and universalized 
principles. I conclude the chapter by showing contemporary city making as a field 
that is highly rationalized, organized, and globalized. Finally, in Chapter 5, I 
summarize the central points of  my argument, before discussing some implications 
of  my account for city making and urban theory.  
                                                   
3  Critical reviewers have pointed out that the extreme focus on the global middle class 
marginalizes the city making capacity of other groups, such as the global working class and 
floating migrant workers in many global cities. I am not denying that there many people in global 
cities who would fall into what the examiner refers to as a global working class – but these people 
do not become a reference point for city making. This is unless of course their demands are 
articulated by NGOs and middle class activists – and even then, what is theoretically important in 
such cases is that cities are being re-made around liberal notions of freedom – a very typically 
global middle class value. 
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CHAPTER 2  
GENTRIFICATION, GLOBAL CITIES AND CITY MAKING 
In this chapter, I provide a review of  classic studies of  the following phenomena – 
gentrification, the formation of  global cities, the shift towards urban 
entrepreneurialism and cultural regeneration strategies, in urban policy, and in 
general, the consumerization of  cities. I show that these phenomena are not 
disparate, and scholarly trends indicate an increasing awareness of  city making. 
Finally, I conclude by discussing some limitations of  existing approaches for studying 
urban change, and propose alternative I refer to as an institutional perspective on city 
making and urban change. 
2.1 From gentrification to global city formation: The emergence of political 
economy perspectives on city making 
Gentrification, as a concept, has lent itself  well to generalization beyond the 
narrow context in which it was originally created. While this very ubiquity of  the 
term in various discourses points towards the similarity of  processes in cities around 
the world, it has also generated some conceptual obscurity. To understand this, it is 
helpful to return to the origin of  the concept. The term “gentrification” was coined in 
1964 by the English sociologist, Ruth Glass, to describe the displacement of  working 
class residential areas by middle class residents and the concomitant transformation 
of  the area in various districts of  London:  
One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London have been 
invaded by the middle classes – upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and 
cottages – two rooms up and two down – have been taken over, when their 
leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger 
Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period – which were 
used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation – a have 
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been upgraded once again … Once this process of “gentrification” starts in a 
district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class 
occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is 
changed. (Glass 1987[1964]:138).  
Glass‟s portrayal has become widely accepted as offering the definitive 
description of  “classic gentrification”, where “disinvested inner-city neighbourhoods 
are upgraded by pioneer gentrifiers and the indigenous residents are replaced” (Lees 
et al. 2010:10). In actual fact, this has to be understood within the context of  a trend 
of  suburbanization that took place in the Anglophone world beginning in London in 
the late nineteenth century, and in the US by the first decades of  the twentieth 
century. What is important is that throughout the Anglophone world, 
suburbanization became the dominant trend, as populations in the US, UK, Canada 
and Australia “suburbanized in the post-war decades as compared with southern 
European and Latin cultures more generally” – and may I add, Asian cities – “where 
the middle classes clung to the urban core for longer (Butler, 1995:190) 4. Urban 
development took two paths of  development in the Western world in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – in the Anglo-American model, the trend 
was towards decentralization. On the other hand, in the rest of  Europe, the tendency 
was towards greater centralization (Hall and Twedwr-Jones 2011:27-54). 
Suburbanization was also greatly fueled in the twentieth century in America by the 
increasingly affordable automobiles and the government sponsored construction of 
highways to accommodate the automobile. This gradually reshaped the American 
urban landscape, leading to urban sprawl (Glaeser 2011:165-197, Gutfreund 2004). 
                                                   
4 While the difference in urban development can be attributed to the divergent urban planning 
traditions that emerged, decentralizing models espoused by individuals like Howard Ebezner in 
the Anglo-American tradition (see Hall and Twedwr-Jones 2011:28-31) were probably reinforced 
by anti-urban discourses that were largely Anglophone. In the UK, this was represented by the 
artists of the Romantic Movement, who articulated a preference for rural living by extolling the 
beauty and virtues of the countryside. In the US, there is no better representative of the anti-urban 
movement than Henry David Thoreau, who wrote his book Walden based on the experience of 
living alone in the woods for two years.  
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Without these earlier trends of  decentralization in the Anglo-American context, it is 
unlikely that Glass and subsequent authors would have chosen to focus on the 
uplifting of  inner city residential areas.  
Hence, it is not thus surprising that one of  the main and earliest theories of  
gentrification – famously known as the “rent gap thesis”, draws on this historical fact. 
Smith (1979) argued that as a result of  suburbanization in the US, old buildings in 
many existing inner cities had fallen into disuse, leading to a rent gap between the 
existing use value of  the land and the potential, or, in his own words, a “disparity 
between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized” 
(Smith 1979:545). Once the rent gap was big enough for real estate developers to 
make a profit by exploiting the difference between the exchange value and the 
potential use value of  the real estate, Smith argued, gentrification would ensue. Thus, 
in this explanation, gentrification was result of  the “movement of  capital” back into 
the city. While the explanation made sense in the context of  the experience of 
suburbanization of  American cities, and even in cities in the UK the mechanism was 
more problematic when applied to other cities. Thus, gentrification, if  defined as a 
moving in of  middle class residents into inner city areas, never actually played out as 
strongly in other cities (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 2011:27-54). Since these cities never 
experienced decentralization and disinvestment like American or British cities did, 
the rent gap thesis was clearly not the only explanation for gentrification. 
In contrast to the supply and production argument implied by the rent-gap, 
which emphasized the role of  capital, the demand and consumption argument 
emphasized the role of  people and their choices. Its chief  proponent, Ley (1980), 
argued for a role in considering the values and preferences of  the gentrifying affluent 
and liberal middle class in providing the demand for gentrified neighbourhoods. Ley‟s 
argument depended on a more general thesis about postindustrial cities and 
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economic restructuring. Nonetheless, although Smith himself  pointed out that Ley‟s 
“hypothesis about post-industrial cities [was] broad enough to account for the process 
internationally” (Smith 1979:540), he rejected the explanation on the grounds that a 
cultural explanation rooted in terms of  individual consumer preference was a 
contradiction in terms5.  
Despite the theoretical squabbles regarding the mechanisms behind 
gentrification, researchers never lost the focus on questions of  actorhood, i.e. “Who 
are the gentrifiers, why, and how are they driving the process?”. Once the concept 
had become seen in terms of  social action and social actors, rather simply than in 
physical terms of  renovation and uplifting – in other words, in terms of  city making – 
researchers began noticing similar patterns of  urban regeneration. These examples 
were not necessarily in disused urban cores; it was not necessarily about middle class 
residents moving into inner city areas; it did not have to involve the rehabilitation of 
old buildings; it was not confined to London, or other English cities, and certainly 
not limited to western cities. At one end of  the extreme was the argument for “rural 
gentrification” (Clark 2005).  Notwithstanding the definitional squabbles, what later 
scholarship shared was the increasing awareness of  “gentrification” simply as the 
spatial manifestation of  social transformation, or in other words, seeing gentrification 
as spatially inscribed social action: 
If we look back at the attempted definitions of gentrification, it should be 
clear that we are concerned with a process much broader than merely 
residential rehabilitation … [A]s the process has continued, it has become 
increasingly apparent that residential rehabilitation is only one facet … of a 
more profound economic, social, and spatial restructuring. In reality, 
residential gentrification is integrally linked to the redevelopment of urban 
waterfronts for recreational and other functions, the decline of remaining 
                                                   
5 Smith (1979) was able to critique Ley‟s (1980) argument because the latter had appeared in an 
earlier conference publication. 
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inner-city manufacturing facilities, the rise of hotel and convention 
complexes and central-city office developments, as well as the emergence of 
modern “trendy” retail and restaurant districts … Gentrification is a visible 
spatial component of this social transformation. A highly dynamic process, it 
is not amenable to overly restrictive definitions.  (Smith and Williams 1986: 
3) 
Scholars reconciled the production and consumption theses of  gentrification 
by presenting them as two sides of  city making. It became increasingly recognized by 
the 1980s that gentrification was not simply “the conversion of  socially marginal and 
working-class areas of  the central city to middle-class residential use, [but also] a 
movement, that began in the 1960s, of  private-market investment capital into 
downtown districts of  major urban centers, [resulting in the] architectural restoration 
of  deteriorating housing and the clustering of  new cultural amenities in the urban 
core” (Zukin 1987:129). In particular, Zukin combined the production and 
consumption theses by focusing on the Yuppie (young urban professional) figure, not 
only as indicator of  change, but also the very vehicle of  change, as it was associated 
with hedonistic consumption and an enthusiasm for urban living. According to 
Zukin, the Yuppie lifestyle came into being during the 1980s  
as financial institutions expanded on their existing urban base, they took 
advantage of proximity to the city‟s cultural amentities to satisfy the needs to 
professional, high-income-wage earners, both male and female, for 
amusement. (Zukin 1998:830) 
Furthermore,  
Their [yuppies] salaries and bonuses, moreover, enabled them to pay high 
prices for consumer goods and consumption spaces – for urban apartments, 
restaurants and entertainment. (Zukin 1998:830) 
Zukin, like Ley, saw gentrification as an expression of  qualitatively new 
patterns in urban consumption beyond issues of  residence, and argued that “many 
new urban consumption spaces relate to new patterns of  leisure, travel and culture (Zukin 
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1998:825, my italics). She hinted at the institutionalized nature of  such preferences, 
without really developing this line of  thought further. For instance, she suggests that 
“the near-universality of latte bars suggests that many consumption practices related 
to urban middle-class lifestyles have become widespread” (Zukin 1998:832). Fuelled 
by the media media coverage and pop culture phenomena of  the Yuppie figure 
during the later part of  the 1980s, gentrification studies underwent a productive 
period of  scholarship, and gentrification itself  even became celebrated as the solution 
for urban problems (Slater 2006). The emphasis on lifestyle, however, in no way 
suggested that structural factors were unimportant. On the contrary, although the 
production and consumption arguments had been reconciled to a certain extent, 
theoretical integration had been achieved on the basis of  seeing them as expressing 
two sides of  a similar, underlying economic transformation. By the end of  the 1980s, 
it had become more or less accepted that gentrification had become increasingly 
“entwined with wider processes of  urban and economic restructuring” (Smith 
2002:440). Gentrification was reconceptualized as 
the social and spatial manifestation of the transition from an industrial to a 
post-industrial urban economy based on financial, business and creative 
services, with associated changes in the nature and location of work, in 
occupational class structure, earnings and incomes, lifestyles and the 
structure of the housing market, (Hamnett 2003:2402) 
and that  
the basis of an effective explanation has to rest on the demand side as much 
or more than the supply side of the equation. But, in making this case, an 
argument is not being made for a naïve version of consumer sovereignty, but 
for recognition of the importance of changes in the economic base and class structure 
of cities in the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism. (Hamnet 
2003:2403, my italics) 
25 
  
Thus, this sort of  perspective emphasized the economic restructuring from an 
industrial to postindustrial base and the occupational transformations associated with 
such change, and as such, did not venture too far from the basic economic argument 
that undergirds most explanations about cities. Since cities are primarily shaped by 
economic forces, and since consumers and consumption now drive economic growth, 
by proxy, consumption increasingly becomes a major force in shaping postindustrial 
cities: 
The contemporary city is the product of the post-industrial consumer 
economy created through a fundamental shift between production and 
consumption –  where the balance of power between the producer and 
consumer that pervades daily life has changed in favour of the latter. (Jayne 
2006:3) 
Phrased differently, gentrification became reconceptualized as the spatial inscription 
of  economic restructuring: 
Gentrification was initially understood as the rehabilitation of decaying and 
low-income housing by middle-class outsiders in central cities. In the late 
1970s a broader conceptualization of the process began to emerge, and by the 
early 1980s new scholarship had developed a far broader meaning of 
gentrification, linking it with processes of spatial, economic and social 
structuring. Gentrification emerged as a visible spatial component of this 
transformation. It was evident in the redevelopment of waterfronts, the rise 
of hotel and convention complexes in central cities, large-scale luxury office 
and residential developments, and fashionable, high priced shopping 
districts. (Sassen 1991:255) 
Gentrification literature‟s emphasis on economic structuring led it to develop 
an affinity with the global/world city research trajectories, especially in the 1980s. 
Although there had been some awareness of  a global urban system as early Peter 
Hall‟s (1966) notion of  world cities, it was not until Friedmann and Wolff ‟s (1982) 
classic piece, “World City Formation”, which firmly revived the tradition. Drawing 
upon world system theory, Friedmann and Wolff  attempted to account for hitherto 
disparate urban phenomena, by describing a process of  a “spatial articulation of  the 
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emerging world system of  production and markets through a global network of  cities” 
(Friedmann and Wolff  1982:309). In other words, world cities are understood as 
spatial manifestations of  global economic processes. Specifically, world cities are the 
physical sites from which transnational corporations control and organize global 
production and markets, by serving “as banking and financial centres, administrative 
headquarters, centres of  ideological control, and so forth” (Friedmann and Wolff  
1982:312). Consequently, world cities experience fundamental economic 
restructuring in the form of  growth of  a large cluster of  professionals who provide 
services ranging from management and banking to research and higher education 
(Friedmann and Wolff  1982:320). These are members of  the gentrifying class that 
have been given much focus and attention by the consumption theorists of 
gentrification. Concomitantly, a cluster of  service workers develops in response to the 
primary professional class, largely to serve their needs, and also a third and perhaps 
largely indistinguishable class of  workers engaged in tourism also emerge (Friedmann 
and Wolff, 1982:320). Included in the secondary cluster are occupations related to 
hotel services, restaurants, luxury shopping, entertainment, and so on.  
Saskia Sassen‟s (1991, 2001) global city thesis sought to understand why 
certain cities emerge as centres in the global economy, despite the development of 
new technologies that facilitate decentralization of  capitalist control and 
coordination of  production and of  markets. Her focus on New York, London and 
Tokyo underscores her emphasis on all these cities as financial centres and homes to 
major stock exchanges. What makes global cities “global”, according to Sassen, is 
that they are “sites of  production… for the production of  specialized services needed 
by complex organizations for running a spatially dispersed network of  factories, 
offices, and service outlets; and the production of  financial innovations and the 
making of  markets, both central to the internationalization and expansion of  the 
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financial industry” (Sassen 2001:5). Sassen claims that concentration occurs as firms 
increasingly rely on other firms located close by for factors of  production, such as 
legal, technical and other specialist services which they are unable to provide 
themselves. Another reason is that “concentration arises out of  the needs and 
expectations of  the people likely to be employed in these new high-skill jobs, who 
tend to be attracted to the amenities and lifestyles that large urban centers can offer 
and are likely to live in central areas rather than in suburbs” (Sassen 2001:12). The 
economic base of  production and capital accumulation are understood as the real 
forces driving cities, which are in turn, manifestations of  the more fundamental and 
important economic forces of  production. Consequently,  
the mode of world system integration (form and strength of integration; 
spatial dominance) will affect in determinate ways the economic, social, 
spatial and political structure of world cities and the urbanizing processes to 
which they are subject. (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982:313) 
In this way, urban studies began to see gentrification as an expression of  
global economic restructuring. Gentrification was a byproduct and consequence of 
the rise of  professional and managerial classes that were necessary to the workings of  
this new economic structure. By explaining gentrification as the spatial manifestation 
of  shifts in the economic structure – a global capitalist economic system, this 
approach was able to provide plausible theoretical integration and explain why 
gentrification was occurring in multiple cities across the world. It thus produced a 
viable – if  rudimentary – political economy theoretical model of  city making6. 
  
                                                   
6 I do not see the capital/culture (supply/demand) debate within gentrification studies as posing 
two diametrically opposed models. Instead, both of them can be theoretically integrated within a 
political economy model of social change, which ultimately assumes the motor of social change as 
stemming from the economic realm. Thus, when I refer to political economy perspectives on city 
making, I am using it in an expanded and broader sense. 
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2.2 The sophistication of political economy perspectives  
This rudimentary political economy approach towards understanding city 
making did not go unproblematized for long. What had originally been understood as 
a unidirectional relationship between capital and culture had become more 
obfuscated by the end of  the 1980s. More specifically, rather than cities attracting 
investment because they had devalorized cores, or experiencing gentrification because 
of  the entrance of  the middle class, new patterns of  urban development emerged 
where 1) cities had to appear cool to attract investment in the first place; 2) cities had to 
be gentrified and look cool to attract the middle class in the first place. I illustrate what 
I mean with two examples. 
With reference to the first point that cities had to appear cool to attract 
investment in the first place, the critical Marxist geographer, David Harvey (1989) 
gives us what is probably the most influential view of  this perspective. According to 
Harvey, in the realm of urban policy, there was a general consensual shift from a 
managerial form of  urban planning to an entrepreneurial form of  urban governance 
during the 1970s and 1980s. For Harvey, this is the result of  the liberalization of  
capital and the intensification of  inter-urban competition, where cities are 
increasingly forced to compete to attract capital: 
The urban region can also seek to improve its competitive position with 
respect to the spatial division of consumption. There is more to this than 
trying to bring money into an urban region through tourism and retirement 
attractions… Investments to attract the consumer dollar have paradoxically 
grown a-pace as a response to generalised recession. They increasingly focus 
on the quality of life. Gentrification, cultural innovation, and physical 
upgrading of the urban environment (including the turn to postmodernist 
styles of architecture and urban design), consumer attractions (sports stadia, 
convention and shopping centres, marinas, exotic eating places) and 
entertainment (the organization of urban spectacles on a temporary or 
permanent basis), have all become much more prominent facets of strategies 
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for urban regeneration. Above all, the city has to appear as an innovative, exciting, 
creative, and safe place to live or to visit, to play and consume in. (Harvey 1989:9, 
my italics) 
Harvey notes that there has been a change in the way cities are governed, 
arguing that there has been a shift from urban planning and a centralized provision of 
services, usually by states and municipal governments, towards what he calls an 
entrepreneurial mode of  urban governance where an increasingly decentralized 
coalition of  public and corporate actors are focused on making the city more 
competitive and attractive to capital investment. It is entrepreneurial because of  the 
heightened element of  risk taking, speculation and experimentation with city making. 
Furthermore – and this is crucial – Harvey emphasizes that the building of 
attractions and promoting consumption is not simply about attracting investment capital 
in the form of  built spaces in the city. In other words, this goes beyond a simple 
“commoditization of  culture” argument. Rather, what Harvey has in mind is that in 
order to attract investment at all, cities have to appear like great places to live, play 
and consume. Cities increasingly became represented as brands. Terms such as city 
marketing and city branding became fashionable discourses and in fact became 
“established practices within urban management” (Kavartzi 2007:695, see also 
Greenberg 2000:230). 
This observation still finds resonance more than two decades later, and today, 
promoting leisure, consumption, and entertainment has become one of  the main 
ways for cities to project images of  being world-class and global: 
No longer just epicentres of capital transactions, cities are „going global‟ on 
the basis of integrating economic and cultural activity as an urban 
regeneration strategy. Place-wars among cities to attract investors have 
intensified around the production and consumption of culture and the arts, 
often taking the form of the construction of mega-projects and hallmark 
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events, the development of a cultural industries sector and an upsurge of 
urban image-making and branding activities (Yeoh 2005:945). 
Today, common is the claim that cities have to turn to “cultural strategies” to 
reinvigorate their urban economies. This statement is easily verified by an expansion 
of  discussion on what is now referred to as cultural planning, urban regeneration, 
urban renewal – in short – an “urban renaissance”, centered around the promotion of  
middle class consumption (Evans 2003, 2001). This is further exemplified by Richard 
Florida‟s notion of  the creative class and the creative cities. This also connects to my 
point that cities now had to be gentrified to attract the creative class. Thus, it is 
significant that the empirical and conceptual basis of  Florida‟s work cannot easily be 
separated from its policy recommendations (Peck 2005). What is interesting is that 
Florida himself  re-uses an argument reminiscent of  Ley‟s (1980) original argument 
that middle class professionals – he calls them the creative class – are choosing to live 
in edgy cities that promise excitement and lifestyle opportunities, hinting that the 
creative class are in some sort of  position to make demands on the cities, and 
influence city making. While Florida has been widely criticized for promoting a “fast 
urban policy” (Peck 2005) and thus positively affirming class and contemporary 
capitalist development on dubious grounds (see also Krätke 2010, Scott 2006 for 
other critiques of  Florida), it is undeniable that the creative city discourse has 
circulated rapidly and globally within policy circles:  
Notwithstanding the issue of the intrinsic value of Florida‟s insights, a 
perhaps more pertinent question concerns why they have struck such a chord 
amongst urban elites. (Peck 2005:342).  
The rapid adoption of  cultural and consumption strategies in urban 
development in cities around the world has gained the attention of  urban scholars 
and sparked off  another renaissance in gentrification studies. In contemporary 
gentrification research, scholars increasingly use the concept of  gentrification to refer 
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the general reshaping of  city visions oriented towards lifestyle and consumption on 
the part of  states, municipal governments, corporations, policymakers, developers, 
architects, and so on. Neil Smith (2002), drawing on the experience of  gentrification 
in the US, calls this the third phase of  gentrification, of  “gentrification generalized” 
to the level of  global urban strategy. Table 2.1 summarizes the transformation in 
gentrification.  
Table 2.21: Three waves of gentrification 
Wave of 
gentrification 
1950s-1960s 1970s-1980s 1990s-current 
Spatial 
Inscription 
Mainly residential Consumer amenities Integrated landscape 
complexes of  lifestyle 
Scale Inner city areas of 
London and East Coast 
US cities 
Advanced capitalist 
cities / global cities 
Global process, laterally 
















generalized to level of 












 (Adapted from Smith 2002) 
Beyond simply referring to changes in the spatial manifestation of  
gentrification, this table also demonstrates the gradual increment in the scale of  
gentrification, the associated institutional processes surrounding it, and the changing 
role of  the gentrifiers in each stage. In each stage, gentrification becomes more 
complex and its manifestations become more abstract and generalized. More 
importantly, gentrification becomes more formally organized. The literature on 
gentrification, as Shaw (2008:1704) summarizes, has identified various roles – 
represented in a stage model – who have acted as gentrifiers, including bohemians, 
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home renovators, “new middle class”, corporate investors and developers, banks and 
governments. Despite the problem of  applying linear stage-models to the study of 
gentrification in very diverse contexts, what seems to be consistent is the observation 
that by the 1990s, gentrification had become a policy directive where the gentrifiers 
were governments working in partnership with corporations. Smith (2002:439) states 
that there was a shift from Ruth Glass‟s depiction of  gentrifiers as middle class 
immigrants to neighbourhoods in the 1960s, to the current phase where the 
gentrifying role has been taken up by organizations – governments, corporations, or 
partnerships between the two.  
Despite the general consensus that scholars have achieved in the field of  
gentrification studies, some scholars disagree with how best to understand 
gentrification. Clark (2005), for instance, argues that scholars have confused and 
conflated the concept with the phenomenon. According to him, Ruth Glass coined 
the concept, but did not discover the phenomenon, since there were historical 
antecedents which involved “change[s] in the population of  land-users such that the 
new users are of  a higher socio-economic status than the previous users” (Clark 
2005:258). Conversely, in the same line of  argument, Clark states that gentrification 
has not gone global; rather, the concept has gone global, “diffusing as the geographic 
foci of  gentrification research has expanded” (Clark 2005:260). However, such an 
interpretation is theoretically problematic. First, it is focused on the outcome – 
suggesting it is gentrification as long as a group with higher socio-economic status 
replaces a group with lower socio-economic status. This is a rather formal and 
ahistorical definition, which glosses over observable differences in the scale of  formal 
organization that suggest that there is something dramatically different about 
classical gentrification and “gentrification as global urban strategy” (Smith 2002). 
Also, to also say that the concept has gone global, but not the process itself, is also to 
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ignore much of  the expanding research on urban policy transfer, and notions of  
making global cities through “cultural imagineering” (Yeoh 2005). I suggest that most 
of  this confusion over terminology can be avoided by focusing instead on the notion 
of  city making, which is less loaded than gentrification, and is broad enough to 
accommodate empirical variation. At the centre of  these debate are issues to do with 
what a city means, and an increasing concern with questions of  who defines city visions 
and makes cities, how they do so, and with what consequences.   
2.3 Political economy models and some of their blind spots 
We have accumulated substantial empirical descriptions of  the complex 
processes that surround city making – mostly from a political economy angle – are 
now at an excellent juncture in the scholarship for some theoretical synthesis and the 
proposition of  new directions in research. For one, there is general acceptance and 
recognition of  the rising importance of  the preferences of  the middle class in driving 
urban change. Yet, while the institutionalized nature of  such preferences are hinted 
at, but never fully explored nor developed into a viable theory of  city making:  
The question as to why some activities continue to cohere in what were 
industrially based city spaces is one of the most crucial puzzles of the 
contemporary city. The entertainment machine provides a key piece of the 
puzzle… Contemporary consumption practice extends to the consumption of 
space. The lifestyle concerns of social participants are increasingly important in 
defining the overall rationale for, and in turn driving, other urban social processes 
(Clark et al 2002:499, italics mine). 
Explanations that take into account consumer demand tend to be somewhat 
atomistic and simplistic, assuming that middle class gentrifiers make cities simply 
through their demand for certain kinds of  urban environments. This might have been 
plausible in the first phase of  gentrification (see Table 2.1 on page 31), but this 
mechanism becomes a bit stretched in the second phase, and implausible in the third 
phase when gentrification became a feature of  the urban policy process. 
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Political economy perspectives have sought to address this problem with the 
concept of  inter-urban competition. Yet, although Harvey‟s (1989) discussion of 
neoliberal urban regimes – makes the point that cities need to present themselves as 
cities as cool, exciting and liveable cities to attract investment in a competitive world, 
what is less clear is the question of  why this idea – that such cities would attract 
investment in the first place – has such salience and legitimacy, and has come to be 
taken-for-granted and naturalized. Indeed, such isomorphism among global cities 
within such a short span of  a few decades seems to be based less on any sort of  real 
economic calculation, but more on the basis of  a normative and cognitive template of  
how global cities ought to look:  
[A] gentrification “blue-print” is being mass-produced, mass-marketed, and 
mass-consumed around the world. As the urban-rural dichotomy has broken 
down… as a significant part of the world has become increasingly urbanized 
and desirous of an urban(e) lifestyle, the result seems to be that even some 
Third World cities and First World suburban and rural areas are 
experiencing gentrification. (Davidson and Lees 2005:1167, my italics) 
Not only are cities worldwide experiencing uplifting, they are also 
experiencing it in very expected and convergent ways, almost according to a 
generalized blue-print. Such outcomes point to the creation and diffusion of  shared 
and universalized cultural models of  urban development. Indeed, it is hard to see 
how consumption strategies in urban development would have been so quickly 
adopted all over the way simply on the basis of  rational economic calculation by state 
and corporate actors. Peck (2005), for example, dismisses Florida‟s proposals as 
“snake oil”, insinuating that there is perhaps little or no efficacy behind Florida‟s 
recommendations of  promoting creativity to stimulate urban growth. While Peck 
sees this as a problem, I see this precisely as evidence for the deep institutionalization of  
global city visions. In other words, globally modern cities are being defined in reference 
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to the concerns of  individual consumption and lifestyle, but this is not a simple case 
of  individual middle class individuals demanding certain kinds of  urban 
environments. How can this conundrum be theoretically resolved?  
First of  all, even without taking any meta-theoretical positions, given the 
ubiquity of  the consumerist vision of  cities in policy and popular discourse, we might 
expect the notion of  consumption, leisure and lifestyle, to also play a huge part in 
answering these questions. Yet, since production takes central place in political 
economy explanations of  urban change – which also happens to dominate urban 
theory – consumption is treated as a residual category that is implied by, or logically 
following from transformations in economic production and work. For example, the 
world city perspective argues that secondary (including restaurants, luxury shopping, 
entertainment, etc.) and tertiary industry centred on international tourism arise to 
service the needs of  transnational elites (Friedmann and Wolff  1982). Furthermore, as I 
noted earlier, scholars advocating consumption driven explanations of  gentrification 
resort to defending the perspective on the basis that it is rooted in the transformation 
of  class structure in the context of  a shift from industrialism to post-industrialism 
(Hamnett 2003). Even Richard Florida (2002)‟s emphasis on the promoting of  spaces 
for consumption, leisure and lifestyle in modern cities, belie his more traditional 
concerns with economic production and work productivity – authentic spaces, for 
instance, are places that supply inspiration (resource of  production) to creative 
workers. 
In summary, it is probably safe to say that the study of  urban change in the 
last thirty years or so have been mostly approached from a political economy 
perspective. Here, research is usually focused around explaining change as a function 
of  transformations in the economy, defined in terms of  a more fundamental reality of  
work and production. For instance, numerous commentators have focused on the 
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transformation from an industrial society focused on making things to a 
postindustrial society that produces services, ideas and symbols. Others yet note the 
shift from a Fordist model of  mass production to a post-Fordist model of  flexible 
accumulation. If  consumption plays a more central explanatory role in theoretical 
accounts, it is usually explained with reference to the rise of  the professional middle 
classes, the growth of  which is again explained with reference to economic 
restructuring and the growth of  the financial and advanced producer services7. In the 
case of  city making case, we find similar imagery of  discussions of  an endless list of  
words being appended to “economy” – I have in mind concepts ranging from 
postindustrial economy (Ley 1980), to symbolic economy (Zukin 1998), cultural 
economy (Scott 1997). Some authors simply call this the new economy (Hutton 2004, 
Scott 2006). With the exception of  qualitative, ethnographic case studies, most do not 
focus much on lifeworld consumption, either treating it as naturally following from 
economic new modes of  (economic) production (postindustrial economy leads to 
professionals with higher disposable salary to engage in consumption), treating 
consumption itself  as a means of  production (creative production), or including it as 
a kind of  production (in the sense of  economic accounting of  service and 
entertainment industries). There is some pioneering research into the role of  global 
                                                   
7 Much of contemporary urban studies has theoretical roots in the “new urban sociology”, which arose as a 
result of influence from the New Left, neo-Maxist political economy approaches in the wake of failure of 
approaches such as urban ecology to sufficiently address urban phenomena of the late 1960s and 1970s. The 
strength of political economy lies in its overarching framework, and its ability to provide a global perspective. 
Political economy explains gentrification, global city formation and cultural strategies within the framework 
of economic and technological transformation. This economic change – depending on the author – varies 
from the shift from an industrial to postindustrial economy, the shift from Fordism to post-Fordist flexible 
production, de-regulation of labour and capital markets, to the rise of finance and associated producer 
services. Some accounts utilize a centre-periphery model, notably in the global cities literature, which itself 
has roots in the Wallerstein‟s world-system theory. On a smaller scale, this centre periphery model is also 
applied to understanding gentrification. Thus, focus is on change from producing machines to producing 
services, knowledge, symbols, and so on (Gottdiener and Hutchinson 2011:1-22, 75-98).  
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policy networks and urban policy transfer8, but what is less certain is if  there is any 
theoretical connection between this and the consumerization of  city visions.  
2.4 An institutionalist perspective on city making 
Thus, the political economy models of  city making I explored in the previous 
section mainly focus on the objective, economic conditions of  city building and takes 
for granted that actors are “real” actors, mainly states or corporations engaging in 
rational calculation and economic action. For example, real estate developers seek 
out profitable investments; states and municipal governments seek to reinvigorate 
urban economies. Even when there is a consideration of  consumer demand, the 
economic implication is clear: middle class individuals are seen as calculating 
consumers.  
Thus, while political economy perspectives have been instrumental in 
directing our attention to organizational actors and the larger global economic 
context, it does run into several limitations. One, it has little to say about the broader 
institutional processes of  city making which I am interested in. First of  all, political 
economy has little to say about the role of  norms and cultural scripts in city making. 
It treats city makers as rational actors, and in doing so, artificially bracket the role of  
norms, scripts, and cultural knowledge which inform their social action. As I alluded 
to in the first chapter, a more holistic an understanding of  city making needs to go 
                                                   
8  There are numerous strands of emerging innovative poststructuralist research – notably from within 
geography but also more general urban studies – which are moving away from purely political economic 
modes of explanation. These studies are increasingly turned towards notions of “mobile urbanism,” “urban 
assemblages,” “urban policy mobilities,” “urban policy tourism,” “travelling cities,” “learning cities,” and so 
on (McCann 2011, McCann and Ward 2011a, González 2011, McFarlane 2011). Drawing on the notion of 
networks, relationality, mobility, travel, process and flux – these concepts and research see cities as 
institutional process rather than stable spatial entities. All of them highlight the role of knowledge, mobile 
agents of knowledge, and the networks within which such knowledge travel, as important factors in 
contributing to urban change, rather than simply seeing urban change as the result of the dynamics of 




beyond seeing it purely shaped by the coercive economic and political power of 
corporations and states. These may be very powerful organizational actors, but even 
then, they do not act purely in instrumental-rational ways, and certainly not in an 
institutional vacuum. For example, Harvey‟s discussion of  entrepreneurialism in 
urban strategy alluded to urban coalitions who have very diverse interests: 
the real power to reorganise urban life so often lies elsewhere or at least 
within a broader coalition of forces within which urban government and 
administration have only a facilitative and coordinating role to play. The 
power to organise space derives from a whole complex of forces mobilised by 
diverse social agents (Harvey, 1989:6).  
Given diverse city makers with diverse interests, as well as cities with very 
different histories and geographies, one pertinent question is why is it the case that 
global city visions centred around consumption and lifestyle have spread so quickly 
over the world? Even if  we do assume – as Harvey does – that it is ultimately 
economic and class-driven, there is still space for broader institutional considerations. 
Let me illustrate what I mean through a hypothetical example. Neoliberal alliances 
may result in the construction of  a new entertainment and consumption complex, but 
there is always a target population the investment is aimed at. In business circles, the 
target population is often referred to as a unitary “market”. This market “wants” 
certain experiences, and “demands” certain kinds of  goods, services, and experiences. 
Since this “market” indirectly affects how real estate developers evaluate investment 
options, or how municipal governments or states adopt certain policies to attract such 
investment, “the market” is in a broad sense, “acting” on cities through organizations as 
a reference point for city making. As such, my focus is very different from traditional 
approaches to city making. Instead of  focusing on direct economic and political 
power, where the city makers are powerful corporations and states, I am interested in 
more mimetic and normative forms of  power that produces the sense-making 
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frameworks within which city makers operate (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). What 
sorts of  considerations and what points of  references do these organizations have? 
What kind of  cognitive scripts do city makers – including political and economic 
actors – rely on?  
What do I mean by institutions? I am not simply referring to organizations 
such as states or corporations – although these are examples of  institutions. 
Institutions, broadly speaking, are social rules, “comprised of  regulative, normative 
and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott 2008:48). While institutionalist 
thinking may not be familiar in urban studies, it has a long tradition in sociological 
discourse. For instance, Emile Durkheim famously defined sociology as the “science 
of  institutions”, where the aspiration was to build a general theory of  how 
institutions emerge and function (Durkheim 2004[1895]). This thesis draws on 
sociological neo-institutionalism (hereafter, simply “institutionalism”) of  the Stanford 
school and the related world society theory, which synthesize Durkheimian and 
Weberian perspectives on institutional analysis (Drori and Krücken 2010, Meyer 
2010, Jepperson 2002, Meyer et al. 1987). One central task of  analysis is to 
understand how institutionalization takes place (Berger and Luckmann 1966). 
Institutionalization can be described as sets of  process by which certain “social 
processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rulelike status in social 
thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan 1977:341). 
I argue that the global middle class is one of  the major vehicles and reference 
points for contemporary city making, and that the contemporary urban condition 
needs to be understood in light of  the emergence of  this class. Of  course, I am in no 
way suggesting that cities are only shaped by the global middle class. Obviously, cities 
are shaped by different forces, but of  all these, the global middle class can be said to 
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be relatively new, and thus, under-theorized. The first step towards such an 
understanding involves understanding the rise of  the global middle class in its 
consumer/lifestyle and expert roles, which has two implications. First, there is the 
emergence of  experts who fill organizational roles necessary for dramatically 
enhanced capacities for formal organizing and rationalized modes of  city making 
according to universalized models of  urban development. Second, there is the 
reflexive understanding of  the consumer and lifestyle role played by the global middle 
class, mediated by organizations such as marketing companies and media 
organizations, which are themselves occupationally staffed by experts and other 
cultural intermediaries (Bourdieu 1984). In this sense, although there has been a 
proliferation of  organizations with diverse interests, the global middle class remains 
an important and major reference point, and thus provides some coherence to the 
logic of  city making. City makers are led by diverse goals and interests, only some of  
which might be economic. In the process of  city making they increasingly orient 
themselves toward the institution of  the global middle class. 
To summarize the discussion so far, the goal of  this thesis is to connect 
contemporary debates within the interdisciplinary field of  urban studies – hitherto 
largely dominated by political economy – to a rich intellectual tradition of  
sociological institutionalist thought. In addition, this thesis also hopes to point the 
way towards an institutionalist perspective on urban studies. While these are modest 
aims, this work will have succeeded if  it is able to encourage further research about 
how institutions beyond the economy affect city making, what sorts of  visions city 
makers carry, how these visions are communicated and institutionalized, and how 
these visions are inscribed onto the urban landscape.   
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CHAPTER 3  
THE GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASS AS REFERENCE POINT 
 IN CITY MAKING  
In the second chapter, I introduced the notion of  a global middle class, which 
I claimed was crucial to understanding why global city visions today are increasingly 
organized around consumption, lifestyle and leisure. Specifically, I argue that the 
global middle class is a major reference point for city making, in at least two roles; 
the lifestyle/consumer role and the professional expert role. I briefly discuss the 
significance of  the middle class, showing the long tradition of  these two roles of  the 
middle class in sociological usage. Next, drawing on secondary data, I show that 
there are hints pointing to a markedly accelerated global spread of  institutional 
processes that generate middle class identity within the last two to three decades. In 
this chapter, I aim to elaborate what I mean by the global middle class, what is so 
“global” about this middle class, and how it differs significantly from previous middle 
classes. Even though the notion of  the global middle class is not theoretically precise 
and rigorous, the term has distinct meanings established in sociological usage, two of  
which I would like to review and draw upon for my argument. 
3.1 The significance of the middle class 
The concept of the middle class in the social sciences is an old one and has 
roots in classical sociology. Although it is one of the most central sociological 
concepts, there is no consensus on its meaning and the concept is often 
operationalized in various ways in empirical research. Furthermore, the concept is 
relatively entrenched in public discourse, and thus has absorbed many meanings that 
affect the use of the term in academic discourse. As a rough indicator, a search on 
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Google with the terms “middle class” yielded about 361 million results, and the term 
“society” only returned 280 million results 9 . To make matters worse, within 
sociology, the concept of the middle class seems to be a constantly shifting one. The 
definition of middle class is continually subject to re-interpretation, with each 
generation of social scientists proclaiming a revolutionary “new” middle class. 
Featherstone (2007:43) reminds us that a lot of effort in sociology has been concerned 
with explaining the role of the “new” middle class, with varying labels attributed to 
them. As a case in point, Archer and Blau (1993), in a review of historical studies of 
the middle class in America, argue that the middle class in America, even when 
operationalized occupationally, has undergone quite a bit of evolution. They point 
out that the composition of the middle class has changed according to historical era:  
Studies of the early to mid-nineteenth century describe the importance of 
artisans in this period in which manual and nonmanual differences in work 
and social status were sorting themselves out. In the early industrial period, 
attention centers on small capitalists. For the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century, with the emphasis on industrialization and large firms, it is white-
collar employees who are defined as comprising the middle class (Archer and 
Blau, 1993:20-21). 
To be sure, this is expected, since the birth of the concept of the middle class 
represents an intellectual effort to cope with and make sense of the outcomes of 
major upheavals in social structure that sociologists today routinely refer to simply as 
modernity: 
However, the term [middle class] was, from the beginning, also associated 
with a value judgment: the middle class as intermediary social stratum of 
secondary importance situated between the main classes: the rich and 
powerful and the poor and powerless. In this interpretation, the term 
highlighted the element of socio-cultural changes that evolved as a core 
feature of the transition from feudal societal structures with their large 
                                                   
9 As of 30 September 2011. 
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number of social classes, towards the modern - industrialized and capitalist - 
societies, including increasingly sharp polarizations between the working 
class poor and the wealthy company owners (Lange and Meiers, 2009:6). 
As the above quote demonstrates, one of the most common interpretation of 
the middle class is simply to think of it as an “intermediate strata in advanced 
industrial societies” (Burris 1986:317, my italics), which is theoretically problematic 
for two reasons. First, this a more specific case of a generalized economism that is 
embedded in the broader development story of modernity, which tends to tell the 
development of modern society from the perspective of transformations in 
technological and productive forces (Jepperson and Meyer 2007). Furthermore, to 
describe the middle class as “intermediary social stratum” or “intermediate strata” 
does not tell us much about the content nor significance of the middle class. 
There are a few ways of defining the classes – and by extension, the middle 
class – class, either in technical or relational terms (vis-à-vis other classes). 
Empirically oriented sociologists who are more interested in measuring the extent of 
the middle class usually operationalize class in terms of amorphous groupings of 
income categories, and sometimes variables like educational achievement, type of 
housing, and so on, are added to provide a more nuanced picture. Nonetheless, the 
focus is usually on income, since income is a good proxy for consumption, lifestyle, 
and values, which is what researchers are interested in measuring, at least when they 
speak of the middle class. And thus, when The Economist (2009) writes about the 
burgeoning middle class in Asia, what the magazine is clearly interested in is the 
transformation in consumption habits, lifestyles and values of people as more 
individuals become middle class. As a further illustration, some scholars describe the 
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new middle class with the label of “new rich” (Lange and Meier 2009:4-5)10. While 
the term is partly pejorative – connoting that the newly rich lack cultural knowledge 
suitable for their newly acquired wealth, what is obviously the focus for 
commentators is the middle class‟ penchant for consumption (Lange and Meier 
2009:4-5). For the most part, income groupings can be arbitrary and not based on 
specific consumption thresholds. As such, much of this work, while useful and 
relevant for policy researchers interested in measuring inequality, is not theoretically 
interesting for understanding the deeper significance of the middle class. There are of 
course exceptions, but these are only interesting insofar as there are theoretical 
justifications made for specifying certain income thresholds. I discuss some of these 
approaches later on.  
Marxist scholars, on the other hand, are less interested in formalistic 
definitions of class, defining class within the relations of production. In traditional 
Marxist theory, the working class and the capitalists (bourgeois) practically define 
each other. Ironically, this actually creates a problem for Marxist scholars. 
Conventional Marxian class analysis treats the middle class as a residual category 
because it is unable to deal with them satisfactorily within its schema of the relations 
of production, as strictly speaking, the middle class cannot achieve class 
consciousness, as its members do not share objective, economic bases for class 
solidarity, and in fact, are external to the bourgeoisie-proletariat relations of 
production envisaged by Marx (Burris 1986:322). Thus, although Marx is aware of a 
middle class, he sees it as largely a residual class which he predicts will vanish with 
increasing class polarization. To some extent, this was empirically true, since Marx‟s 
                                                   
10 The term is also used to refer to the super-rich, but is also sometimes used in a more general 
way to describe the mass expansion of wealth and consumption. 
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notion of the middle class was largely restricted to what he called the petty bourgeois, 
small capitalists and independent artisans. 
There is also the popular notion of a middle class as comprising of “white-
collar” workers. This emerged in the German academic environment in the 1890s as 
a solution to traditional Marxism‟s failure to deal with the expansion of offices and 
bureaucracies, which later became a core theme of Weber‟s pioneering studies on 
bureaucracy. For example, the German sociologist Emil Lederer observed the 
emergence of  the white-collar salaried employee in the early twentieth century as a 
“new” middle class – to be distinguished from the petty bourgeois that Marx had 
observed (cited in Bell 1973:69). The founder of German academic socialism, Gustav 
Schmoller, even went so far as to argue that the “new middle class” of his time – 
referring to salaried employees including civil servants, technical employees, 
supervisors, and so on – would, rather than the proletariat, “embody the general 
interests of society” (cited in Burris 1986:326), thus in effect, turning Marx‟s view of 
class and social change on its head. Today, the debates surrounding the new middle 
classes continue, demonstrating the continued significance and relevance of the new 
middle classes a century later (Featherstone 2007:).  
My task here is to reinterpret the middle class from an institutionalist 
perspective, and in so doing, expand our understanding of the significance of the 
middle class. Specifically, I adopt the meaning of the new middle class in its 
lifestyle/consumption and expert/“white-collar” roles. The first refers to the idea of a 
generalized middle class lifestyle, typically associated with being cultured and 
educated, having a decent standard of living, having access to certain goods and 
services, having certain leisure preferences, and perhaps most importantly, being 
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connected to liberal values of individualism, free will and choice11. This sort of 
identity emerges in modernity, as it is not an ascribed, but rather, achieved identity. 
While the formation of the middle class consumer role is typically attributed to 
education and the passing on of cultural knowledge that distinguished status groups 
from one another, a major part of the development of the middle class cannot be 
divorced from that of the history of consumption.  
As many scholars have noticed, middle class consumers provide the 
institutionalized demand for a generalized, global urban modernity. However, in my 
analysis, consumers are not treated as unitary, atomistic individuals. Rather, my key 
argument is that the global middle class should be seen as a kind of  “constructed 
actor.” The global middle class “acts” indirectly as institutionalized demand, as they 
are often indirectly observed by experts and operationalized through notions like “the 
market”, or some notion of  general “social trends”, which in turn influence and 
affect city makers, such as policy makers or corporations. The values and lifestyle 
practices of  the global middle class are observable through popular media discourse, 
which not only carries evidence of  its institutionalization, but also acts as a vehicle 
for the diffusion of  values associated with the global middle class. My second usage 
of the middle class refers to its professional, expert and technical roles. The emergence of 
the professions is a key part of the historical process Weber referred to as 
rationalization, which is the impersonalization of authority, knowledge, and the 
ordering of different spheres of social life according to increasingly formal, abstract 
and universal principles. Empirical data suggests both a quantitative expansion of  
                                                   
11 I am aware that the notion of the new middle class has been a key concept in political sociology, 
which emphasizes the middle class‟ elective affinity with democratic values, expressed in the 
statement that “[f]ew topics in political sociology have received as much attention as the nature 
and politics of the new middle class” Burris (1986:317). While this political meaning of the new 
middle class forms one part of the semantic history of the concept, I will not be concerned with 
this aspect in my discussion.   
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professionals, as well as increasing institutionalization of  their legitimacy and 
authority. While professionalization creates professions, professionals also become 
the key carriers of rationalization, as they develop, formalize and submit greater parts 
of society to general and universal principles. I discuss this in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
These two meanings of the new middle class should be retained, but the 
concept itself should be updated. For that reason, I propose the concept of a global 
middle class. This difference is not simply terminological – in fact, I argue that the 
global middle class is qualitatively different from previous middle classes. The rest of 
this thesis will discuss how the global middle class affects city making through these 
lifestyle and expert roles. Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this work to offer a 
general theory of the global middle class. What this chapter aims to achieve is to set 
up the context for an exploration of the relationship between the global middle class 
and modern cities. In the next section, I explore the global middle class as an 
empirical category, before elaborating on its analytically separate lifestyle and expert 
roles in Chapter 3.3 and Chapter 4.1. 
3.2 Key aspects of the global middle class  
The global middle class is global for a few reasons. Spatially, members of  the 
group are no longer limited to residents and citizens of  Western, developed countries. 
Furthermore, this group is highly mobile, whether as tourists, students, professionals, 
and so on. As mobile consumers, they contribute to an institutionalized demand for 
increasingly similar types of  urban environments. The lifestyle preferences and values 
of  this group are institutionalized at the level of  world society, rather than at the level 
of  national societies. These post-national aspects of  the global middle class thus 
problematize the unity of  nationally bound conceptions of  middle classes. It is highly 
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illustrative that in the American context, the model of  the American suburban middle 
class has become one type of  middle class lifestyle alongside a more global version of  
the middle class lifestyle with a preference for city centre living. This has been 
empirically confirmed in studies focusing on the renaissance of  cities in the American 
context. American cities began to experience a renaissance in the 1980s, as 
suburbanization began to slow and reverse. Glaeser and Gottlieb‟s (2006) discussion 
of  the phenomenon of  reverse commuting, coupled with evidence on real estate 
prices, urban real wages, and survey data indicate that “people began actively to 
choose to live in cities in the 1980s and 1990s rather than just work there” (Glaeser 
and Gottlieb 2006:1284). People were paying rent premiums to live in densely 
populated cities while commuting to work in the suburbs (Glaeser and Gottlieb 
2006:1283-1284).  
While the notion of  the transnational capitalist class – made up of  owners of  
global corporations, global politicians and bureaucrats, globalizing professionals and 
consumerist elites (Sklair 2000, Robinson and Harris 2000) – may seem close in 
meaning to the concept employed here, there are key differences. First, the concept of 
the transnational capitalist class emphasizes the latter‟s role in facilitating capitalist 
globalization. The global middle class, however, is much more heterogenous, and its 
members work in diverse organizations, from business enterprises to government 
agencies, and non-profits. For that reason, I do not see the global middle class as 
homogenously supporting and promoting “capitalist” interests. Furthermore, 
although the transnational capitalist class approach also emphasizes the similarity of 
the lifestyles and consumption habits of its members, I adopt a less “elitist” and more 
inclusive version of this perspective. Specifically, while the latter approach notes the 
emergence of “exclusive clubs and restaurants, ultra-expensive resorts in all 
continents, private as opposed to mass forms of travel and entertainment,” (Sklair 
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2000:71), I emphasize the democratization of access to higher education, institutional 
resources for lifestyle design and consumption, and even of tourism as key processes 
generating global middle class identity. Thus, the notion of the global middle class 
points to the congruence of a few aspects; purchasing power, education, mobility, 
liberal values, and so on. Finally, the transnational capitalist class is only used in a 
realist sense, of being a “real” actor, whereas my usage of the global middle class has 
a reflexive meaning as a constituted and indirect actor.  
In this regard, while the most common way of measuring the extent of the 
global middle class is to use measures of purchasing power, this is at best a crude 
indicator that sets some initial parameters for specifying the extent of the global 
middle class, which is itself only be a proxy for its institutional power. Many efforts 
have been made to standardize measurements of the middle class, but these can be 
divided broadly into absolute and relative measures. Since I am interested in a truly 
global middle class, it makes sense to focus on absolute measures of consumption 
levels. Thus, if the global middle class is defined as households with daily expenditures 
falling in between between US$10 to US$100 per person, adjusted for purchasing 
power parity (PPP), then there are 1.8 billion people who currently fall into the 
GMC, which translates to about 28% of the world population (Kharas 2010). Income 
indicators provide a fairly similar picture. According to Goldman Sachs‟ economic 
research, whose analysis uses an income range falling in between $6000 and $30,000 
per capita per year in PPP terms, there were a relatively stable number of people – 
about 1 billion – who fell into this category during mid-1970s to 1990. However, this 
figure has exploded to 1.8 billion, with China accounting for about half of this 
massive growth (Wilson and Dragusanu 2008). These ranges are not arbitrary. 
Rather, there is evidence to show that expenditure for “consumer durables as well as 
for services like insurance” increase disproportionately relative to the increase in 
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income from around US$6000 per capita, before tapering after reaching US$25,000 
(Nomura cited in Kharas 2010:11)12. Furthermore, these trends have been projected 
to continue. Current projections indicate the global middle class to nearly triple to 4.9 
billion people by 2030, with 85% of this growth centred on Asia alone (Kharas 
2010:27). Of course, my notion of the truly global middle class is much narrower. 
Even so, these initial observations will no doubt fuel a continued intense observation 
of the global middle class by banks, insurance companies, academic organizations, 
consulting companies, marketing and advertising companies, and so on. 
Numbers alone do not provide the entire picture, since the meaning of the 
global increase in income and expenditure is not captured by economic data. This 
focus on purchasing power indicators must not be mistaken for an economistic 
definition of the global middle class. Rather, from an institutionalist perspective, 
quantifying the extent of monetarization is important because in contemporary 
society, money, far from “being a narrowly economic commodity, is… used to 
support the widest array of identity and activities and choices of modern persons” 
(Jepperson and Meyer 2007:294). In other words, the middle class can be 
conceptualized as “the consumer class” (Kharas 2010:10). Increasing purchasing 
power opens up the realm of consumption to members entering the global middle 
class, allowing them to aspire towards a better life, and as I wrote earlier, sets 
possibilities for global middle class identity. Thus, what distinguishes the middle class 
from other groups is that 
the middle class pursues what is conventionally known as better “quality of 
life” – better health care for the family and more expensive education for the 
                                                   
12 In the actual article, it is written in the language of economics: “there is a kink in consumer demand curves 
around USD6000 per capita. Above this level, the income elasticity for items like consumer durables as well 
as for services like insurance rises well above one. This remains the case until income levels surpass 




children […] , as well as more and better housing, more expensive eatables 
and more entertainment, tobacco, and alcohol. Despite the middle class‟s 
reputation for thrift, some “frivolous” consumption is as middle class as a 
commitment to education or health care (Banerjee and Dufluo 2008:10).  
Furthermore, while I see the global middle class is a constructed actor, this 
perspective does not mean that tracking the actual number of  people who fall into the 
category is completely unimportant. Obviously, the larger the number, the more 
normative and cognitive power the global middle class has on organizational city 
makers. Beyond crude indicators of  purchasing power and expenditure which can 
only provide necessary but insufficient conditions for the emergence of  a global 
middle class, patterns showing broad similarity in the realms of  education, work, 
lifestyles and values across different parts of  the world give a more complete picture 
of  the content of  the global middle class. Studies of  values and attitudes provide 
evidence of  the similar aspirations of  the global middle class. Specifically, the global 
middle class identity is characterized by its strong association with a liberal ideology 
of  individualism. For example, the World Values Survey time-series data has been 
useful in showing a general global shift towards more liberal attitudes (Welzel 2007). 
In a similar vein, the Pew Global Attitudes (2009) survey confirms that middle 
classes in developing countries “consider religion less central to their lives, hold more 
liberal social values, and express more concern about the environment" compared to 
on the other (Pew Global Attitudes 2009:1). Again, this cannot simply be seen simply 
as a function of  increasing economic security, since evidence suggests that economic 
security is not the main factor in driving “liberty aspirations” – liberal orientations 
towards civil and political freedom (Welzel 2007:195-197). But perhaps the 
proliferation of  such studies is the most telling of  the increasing importance of 
individualism itself, since “the availability of these data is itself evidence of the 
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institutionalization of the same trend that the studies formalize and quantify” (Drori 
and Krücken 2010:5).  
This individualism is based on the diffusion of a notion of the agentic 
individual, endowed with a sense of greatly expanded powers and capacity for action 
(Frank and Meyer 2002, Jepperson 2002:248-250). Of course, this does not mean that 
the individual becomes completely agentic and institutions become less important. In 
fact, the opposite is the case. Meyer (1986) argues that modern society is 
characterized by a standardized life course, replete with institutional resources from 
which individuals can construct and project their identity. Much of this 
standardization of life course is most apparent in, and perhaps even definitive of the 
global middle class identity. Choosing where to live, what to do for a career (in fact 
the notion of a career itself) – who to marry, or not to marry at all, what sorts of 
clothes to wear, what kinds of dietary and health regimes to adopt, and leisure 
activities to take up, are all important questions that are bound up with the identity of 
the global middle class.  
Unlike the concept of the transnational capitalist class, the global middle class 
includes the ranks of students in universities and colleges, the number of which has 
been growing rapidly in the last few decades (see Figure 3.1). This is significant 
because the socialization process into the global middle class identity begins from 
university, as students are exposed to ideologies of globalism and cosmopolitanism. 
There is evidence to suggest that education is a stronger predictor than economic or 
financial circumstances, of how much importance an individual will place on liberty 
aspirations (Welzel 2007:197-198). Needless to say, these values are reinforced by 
institutionalized practices of study abroad and student exchange programmes, 
underpinned by highly rationalized and elaborate models of the modern, 
cosmopolitan and educated individual, pushing higher education towards becoming 
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“a designed activity to introduce [to students] an international and multicultural 
outlook” (Varghese 2008:10). The underlying expectation is that in a global world, 
the modern, educated individual should be comfortable living in areas outside of 
their comfort zone. While it is difficult to gauge the precise effect of student exchange 
programmes and internationalization of higher education on values, on a superficial 
level at least, figures show a dramatic increase in university enrollment from the 
1970s, and even more recently, another major spurt from 2000 onwards. 
Furthermore, most of this expansion has been in Asia (see Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.21: Global tertiary education enrolment 
 
(Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2009:10) 
 
Even after controlling for national income (Figure 3.2), it is clear that there is now 
greater representation by what might be considered lower income countries. The rich 
countries, proportionally, represent less of global tertiary education participation. It is 
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in this sense that I speak of an emerging global middle class that is no longer 
concentrated in the very rich countries. This is a major qualitative change that has 
gone unnoticed by researchers focusing on urban change. It would not be far-fetched 
to assume that universities are contributing to a convergence in lifestyle norms, in 
producing a global middle class with similar aspirations and expectations. There is 
some evidence that university students can also be gentrifiers, and at least one scholar 
has written about the phenomenon of “studentification” (Smith 2005). This is not 
unexpected, since the socialization into the global middle class identity begins 
primarily at this stage in the life course. 
Figure 3.22: Global distribution of tertiary education, 1970-2007 
 
(Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2009:12) 
 
One very important factor that makes this emerging global middle class very 
different from all other middle classes that preceded it is the relative global mobility 
afforded to its members. Part of this increase in mobility is in part, traceable to the 
deregulation of air travel which began in 1978 in the US and spread to the rest of the 
developed countries by the 1980s. Since then, the general trend has being towards 
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greater liberalization of air travel, as evidenced by the formation of single aviation 
markets, such as the one in Europe, which was formed in 1993 (IATA 2006:7). Much 
of the recent growth in air travel can be attributed to the Asia-Pacific region. In 2010, 
Asia-Pacific accounted for 647 million passengers, exceeding the 638 million 
passengers who travelled within North America (IATA 2010). These trends are likely 
to continue with the emergence of low-cost carriers, which have made it very 
affordable to travel, accelerating a trend towards mass travel: 
When low-cost carriers (LCCs) burst on to the scene in the late 1990s, it was 
certainly the start of a trend. But perhaps it was less a rise in their fortunes at 
the expense of network carriers, than a move towards the ideal of low costs 
for all carriers (IATA 2010). 
This expansion of air travel has contributed to the increase of global 
tourism13, which is itself a good indicator of  the converging practices of  the global 
middle class consumers. The figures indicate a massive increase in tourism figures 
from the year 1970, a process which accelerated from the 1980s. Again, the aggregate 
data confirms the growth of travel by populations originating from Asia Pacific (see 
Figure 3.3). In addition, the rise of  the global middle class has undermined the 
stereotypical image of  the Western tourist, slowly giving way to an increasing number 
of  tourists who come from non-Western countries. Many of  these come from the 
East Asian countries that have become affluent (Japan, China, South Korea), and 




                                                   
13 Of course, “tourist” here refers to “temporary visitor staying at least twenty-four hours in the country 
visited and the purpose of whose journey can be classified under one of the following headings: (a) leisure 





Figure 3.23: International tourist arrival by region (in million), 1970-2020 
 
(Source: World Tourism Organization, 2011:11) 
 
While it may be tempting to attribute these growing numbers of travellers to 
the expansion of transnational corporations and the increasing mobility of 
transnational elites or expatriates who run corporations, this is simply not the case. 
Part of this increased mobility can be traced to the globalization of professions which 
are not typically associated with corporations – researchers, professors, journalists, 
healthcare professionals, and, as I discussed early – of students. Furthermore, the 
globalization of corporate labour markets increasingly mean that people who work 
overseas need not be on an expatriate pay packet (Smith and Favell 2006). 
Moreover, not only is the new global middle class a mobile one, it is one 
engaged in tourism and travel for the sake of pleasure, leisure and entertainment. In 
2010, travel for leisure, recreation and holidays accounted for 480 million, or 51% of 
international tourist arrivals, compared to a 15% figure reported for business and 
professional purposes (World Tourism Organization 2011:3). Given current trends, 
as more people around the non-Western world enter into the global middle class, the 
institutionalized expectation is for demand for travel and tourism to increase: 
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As prosperity spreads in populous countries of the non-Western world, travel 
demand soars. Tens of millions of Chinese will travel abroad in the next 
decade. They will be soon followed by tens of millions of tourists from India, 
Brazil and other rapidly developing countries, even as tourism from the West 
continues to grow. Current projections of future tourism indicate progressive 
growth in the coming decades (Cohen 2008:333). 
This general expansion of mobility, largely of the global middle class has had an 
impact on how researchers see the world. Previously, scholars interested in physical 
mobility usually studied migration; today, this is increasingly being challenged by the 
emergence of a sociology of mobilities (rather than of migration). One of the main 
proponents of this approach, John Urry, argues that contemporary sociology should 
pay more attention to studying diverse mobilities – which suggests movement – 
rather than be fixated with the concept of society, which, by implication, is static 
(Urry 2000). There is also a deeper connection behind the rise of the global middle 
class and the expansion of mobility and travel, a topic I explore further later in this 
chapter. 
3.3 Lifestyle and consumption as institutionalized semantics  
Although none of the indicators I have provided demarcate clearly the extent 
of the global middle class, on the whole, they do indicate a rapid expansion of key 
elements associated with global middle class identity. As I have already argued, the 
global middle class is defined through similarity of lifestyle and consumption, rather 
than by specific income categories or production relations. The global middle class 
identity is highly bound up with that of being an individual with the agency to choose 
particular modes of life. I must again emphasize that this is not a plea for considering 
consumer agency, intentions and motives from the “bottom up”, which is the 
approach taken by ethnographic studies of individuals who identify as global middle 
class (for instance, Rofe 2003). Rather, the global middle class identity is itself a 
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highly institutionalized role. Campbell (1994) makes the point that consumer motives 
are often “justificatory accounts” of their actions (Campbell 1994:39-44). In other 
words, consumerism is a language which provides the vocabulary for individuals to 
justify and account for their consumer desires. Thus, individuals identify with the 
global middle class consumer identity by learning “vocabularies of motive, along 
with rules and norms of action for various situations, through the common processes 
of socialization” (Campbell 1994:40). The implication is that “motives should thus be 
studied as correlates of occupation or social class” (Campbell 1994:40), and that the 
“true location of motives was to be found in institutions rather than individuals” 
(Parsons cited in Campbell 1994:40). In short, an institutionalist approach turns the 
question of “why do gentrifiers gentrify?,” into a question of “what kind of 
vocabulary do gentrifiers draw on to account for their gentrification, and how were 
these semantics of consumption institutionalized?” 
Scholars have traced the origin of consumerism to the late seventeenth 
century and eighteenth centuries when there began “a flourishing of discourses which 
tried to provide legitimate grounds for the ways of consuming and the goods which 
were such an important part of the emerging bourgeois way of life” (Sassetelli 
2007:35). These discourses continued to evolved in parallel with the evolution of 
markets and of product worlds during the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, and have 
achieved truly global proportions only from the 1980s onwards. From the beginning, 
the evolution of the semantics surrounding consumption involved multiple actors and 
discourses. While these included political and economic actors, they also 
incorporated scientific discourses – particularly of economics and psychology – and 
marketing and advertising practices that were themselves based on scientific 
principles, all of which constructed and naturalized the role of the consumer 
(Sassatelli 2007:32-52). Thus, as Miller and Rose (1997) argue, “without „lifestyle‟ 
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being understood as something linking up a particularly complex of subjective tastes 
and allegiances with a particular product, battles over the best way of linking the 
desires of individuals to the productive machine would take very different forms” 
(p.7). 
As I noted in chapter two, the emergence of the current phase of urbanization 
based on cultural consumption is tied to the emergence of a new middle class, which 
began in the 1950s-1960s, established itself in the 1970s-1980s, and became a global 
phenomenon by the 1990s and 2000s. If this view is accurate, we should expect to see 
a dramatic transformation in the middle class that parallels this historical 
periodization. If we refer back to the income and expenditure indicators, the 
dramatic increase of the global middle class from 1 billion to 1.8 billion from 1990 
does seem to provide some initial support (refer to page 49-50). Beyond the factors I 
examined in the previous section (mobility, higher education, etc.), a major part of 
the emergence of a global has been the increased exposure to popular (global) media, 
partly propelled by expansion of distribution channels (print and broadcast), and later 
on, by the communications revolution in the form of the Internet. Media 
representations of certain lifestyles are a key indicator and vehicle of the 
institutionalization of urban middle class consumption practices. The 
institutionalization of  a consumption-driven urban lifestyle can be thus observed in 
the birth and development of  the modern city magazine, which started in the US in 
the 1960s. These are  
“onsumer magazines that fuse the identity and consumption habits of their 
readers with the branded „lifestyle‟ of a given metropolitan region… [the 
magazine industry] identified the new educated middle-class niche growing 
in metropolitan regions across the country, as well as a breed of visionary 
writers and entrepreneurial publishers who could represent this class and 




In the 1980s, the term “lifestyle”, which, as Featherstone reminds us, 
connotes “individuality, self-expression, and a stylistic self-consciousness" 
(Featherstone, 1987:55) became further popularized through media discourse. In the 
popular media, descriptions and accounts of the yuppie (young urban professional) 
figure became a focus of debate. While the term “yuppie” is pejorative, it is 
illuminating insofar as points to an intense reflection of the nature, practices and 
tendencies of the expanding global middle class. As evidence of this, the expansion of 
the global middle class went hand-in-hand with the growing interest in consumer 
culture and its origins, studies of which burgeoned in the 1980s (for example, 
McKendrick et al. 1982, Appadurai 1986, Campbell 1987, Miller 1987, McCracken 
1988,).  
3.4 The global middle class as a reflexive construct  
The intensification of research and data collection on consumption, lifestyle 
and indicators of the global middle class since the 1980s indicates the growing 
awareness of the significance of the global middle class. Underlying this is a 
generalized expectation that these different aspects (consumption, mobility, education, 
liberal values, etc.) are crucial points of reference for understanding social change. In 
other words, the global middle class identity is as much an entity and object of 
theorization and elaboration (Meyer et al. 1987:25-27) as it is a group of individuals 
sharing similar lifestyles. 
While members of the global middle class can act on their immediate urban 
environments as organized communities, what is theoretically more interesting is that 
the global middle class can also influence city making indirectly as a constituted actor. 
In the realm of marketing, consultancies often speak of trying to “identify the 
market”, or to “capture social trends”. Although notions of “the market” and “social 
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trends” are institutional entities, these can “act” on the social world. The 
understanding of “social trends”, for instance, – mediated by advertising companies, 
brand consultancies and so on – influences what kind of goods are produced. 
Similarly, the global middle class can affect city making and city makers when it is 
observed in reports which attribute primacy to their role in social change. Through 
this mechanism, the global middle class becomes a major reference point for city 
making, affecting cities even if the global middle class does not itself organize itself 
into a movement. To highlight another example consumer trends briefing reports, 
such as the one extracted below, reflect on the significance of the global middle class 
consumers: 
The hundreds of millions (and growing!) of experienced and sophisticated 
urbanites*, from San Francisco to Shanghai to São Paulo, who are ever more 
demanding and more open-minded, but also more proud, more connected, 
more spontaneous and more try-out-prone, eagerly snapping up a whole host 
of new urban goods, services, experiences, campaigns and conversations… 
Back to CITYSUMERS. Consumption-wise, the fast pace and ever changing 
nature of urban life guarantees CITYSUMERS an endless number of new 
and fleeting social connections, experiences and (commercial) temptations. 
All of which means that CITYSUMERS are addicted to the here-and-now, 
experiences, choice and freedom, flexibility and rawness, unrestricted 
opportunity, and yes, the hunt for the Next Big Thing if not the Next Big 
Story. In fact, urban culture is the culture these days*. (Trendwatching.com 
2011). 
Trendwatching.com calls the global middle class “citysumers” to emphasize 
the penchant of  the members of  the global middle class for indulging in urban 
experience. While this sort of  description of  consumers who adore urban lifestyles 
and crave experiences is somewhat clichéd and definitely not new in sociology, what 
is interesting it that it has spread to MBA and business circles, especially since the 
publication of  Pine and Gilmore‟s (1999) The Experience Economy. The increasing 
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importance of  experience in consumption and the individualization of  consumption 
are keenly felt in many other spheres. For example, mass tourism of  the 1970s has 
increasingly given way to customized and individualized travel, as attested by the 
development of  alternative and hyphenated forms of  tourism, many of  which focus 
on active, immersive experience rather simply on passive sightseeing. Coupled with 
this phenomenon is the expansion of  institutional resources which make 
individualized travel possible. These include travel guide books, and the proliferation 
of  websites that allow you to customize travel itineraries and make hotel reservations 
without the need for a travel agency. Backpacking, which started out as a rejection of 
mass tourism, has become a mainstream activity (Cohen 2008). The ultimate form of  
individualized travel is epitomized by websites such as Couchsurfing.com and the 
World Wide Opportunities on Organic Farms (WWOOF) movement, which promise 
authentic experiences to live like natives do.  
This increased mobility afforded by the global middle class has contributed to 
a re-ordering of  place in the modern world via the language of  travel and tourism 
(Franklin 2004). Only with the emergence of  a language of  “going places”, places – 
and in this work, specifically, cities – does it make sense for cities to have to be made 
“visitable” (Dicks 2003). This has contributed to a relative blurring of  boundaries 
between tourists and residents, or the “end of  tourism per se” (Urry 1995:150). While 
Urry‟s statement is questionable on empirical grounds, it is an important insight, 
because if  post-tourism is to become an accurate depiction of  contemporary practices, 
it will likely apply more to the practices of  the global middle class – as being tourists 
and residents simultaneously.  
What I have described only reflects the tip of  the iceberg. There are entire 
media, marketing and advertising industries dedicated to researching and finding out 
about the practices, preferences, values and desires of  global middle class consumers 
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– or in the words of  Trendwatching.com – “citysumers”. Again, this is not so much 
the creation and imposition of  false needs, but “a delicate process of  identification of 
the „real needs‟ of  consumers” (Miller and Rose 1997:6). The significance of  the 
global middle class is reinforced by intense reflection by global consultancy firms, 
think tanks, research organizations, and media publications, such as The Economist 
(Parker 2009) and Financial Times (O‟Neill 2011). For example, The McKinsey Global 
Institute – the research arm of  the global consultancy firm – just produced a report 
on the emerging “consuming class,” which is estimated to grow by another 1 billion 
people by the year 2025 (McKinsey Global Institute 2012). Wheary‟s (2009) article in 
the World Policy Journal is aptly titled “The Global Middle Class is Here: Now What?,” 
indicating the intense reflection and speculation on what the global middle class will 
bring. Banerjee and Duflo (2008) echo the same idea when they write, “[w]e expect a 
lot from the middle classes” (p.3). In short, the global middle class becomes a major 
normative and cognitive frame of  reference for organizational city makers. Much 
attention is spent on finding out the real needs of  its members, the results of  which 
can either be used to inform corporations looking to sell goods, services and 
experiences, or otherwise be used to recommend appropriate policy measures. In this 
sense, the global middle class “acts” as a form of  institutionalized, and constructed 
demand. 
 The global middle class is not just observed via statistics and figures. On a 
more descriptive, lifeworld level, the activities associated with the global middle class 
identity is also observed in the writings of  other social scientists, and importantly, in 
works like Richard Florida‟s, which feeds directly into policy circles. While his 
proposals, methodology and concepts have become the objects of  intense critique by 
social scientists, he does capture quite succinctly the institutionalized notion of  the 
creative professional who experiences a blurring of  boundaries between work and 
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play. The life motto of  the individual of  the creative class, as Florida tells us – based 
on his interviews – has to do with the active accumulation of experiences: 
On many fronts, the Creative Class lifestyle comes down to a passionate 
quest for experience. The ideal, as a number of my subjects succinctly put it, 
is to “live the life” – a creative life packed full of intense, high-quality, 
multidimensional experiences… (Florida 2002:166-167). 
Florida‟s notion of  creativity points to a sort of  double meaning of  his 
creative class. On the one hand, the creative class use “creativity” – whatever it may 
be, in producing whatever it is they produce, be they ideas, music, patent, new 
innovations, and so on. On another level of  meaning, they are creative because they 
are institutional entrepreneurs. Specifically, Florida makes the point that such an 
“active, experiential lifestyle is spreading and becoming more prevalent in society as 
the structures and institutions of  the Creative Economy spread. Despite, or perhaps 
precisely because of  his uncritical view of  this sort of  lifestyle, Florida‟s view is in 
fact quite mainstream and points to a highly institutionalized notion of  the active, 
consuming individual of  modernity. Indeed, many other commentators have 
discussed similar issues. For instance, Featherstone (2007), citing Bourdieu‟s (1984) 
discussion of  the new petite bourgeoisie – cultural intermediaries who create and 
provide symbolic goods and services – states that the “petty bourgeoisie” are 
fascinated with the cultivation of  lifestyle and “consciously invent an art of  living” 
(Featherstone 2007:59). The emphasis is on the active role, and the learning attitude – 
an intellectual attitude – these individuals adopt towards life. And Featherstone has 
the same conclusion as Florida, stating that the “new cultural intermediaries… help 
in transmitting both intellectual cultural goods and the intellectual lifestyle to a wider 
audience” (Featherstone 2007:59). In fact, Florida himself  would qualify as a cultural 
intermediary, since his proposals directly affect urban policy making. 
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To conclude, while the observation that more and more cities around the 
world are embarking on consumption strategies to revitalize themselves is accurate, 
the interpretation of  them as risky, entrepreneurial and speculative has to be qualified. 
To be sure, some of  them involve heavy capital investment in infrastructure and are 
indeed speculative and risky from an investment standpoint. However, these activities 
make sense in light of  the expectations that have been placed on the global middle 
class. Cities may be betting, but they are in fact taking an informed gamble on the 
global middle class. By this reasoning, then, the global middle class consumer 
lifestyle role in city making is also dependent on the observation and reflection on 
their significance by media and marketing organizations; through popular and expert 
discourses produced by marketing experts, consultants, academics, and similar expert 
roles. Without these organizations staffed by all these observing experts, it is difficult 
to imagine how the global middle class consumer lifestyle identity could have so 
much impact on city making. But beyond simply observing the global middle class 
and actually constituting institutionalized demand through their activities, 
professional experts also contribute more directly to city making. This is the subject 





CHAPTER 4  
EXPERTS, CITY VISIONS, AND RATIONALIZATION 
In the last chapter, I elaborated on the concept of  the global middle class, which I 
claimed was the key to understanding why global city visions today are increasingly 
organized around consumption, lifestyle and leisure. I claimed that the global middle 
class plays a dual role – acting as institutionalized demand for certain types of  urban 
lifestyles, but also as experts and professionals. In this chapter, I focus this second 
aspect of  the global middle class14. I discuss consequences of  the rationalization of 
city making as a field of  formal, globally organized, and increasingly professionalized 
social action. Rationalization refers to the structuring of  social life “within 
standardized, impersonal rules that constitute social organization as a means to collective 
purpose” (Meyer et al. 1987:24, my italics).  
The concept of  rationalization helps us understand three institutional 
processes which affect city making today. First, as implied by the second meaning of  
the global middle class, there is the rise of  experts, specifically, scientists, consultants, 
urban planners, architects, policy makers, marketers, and similarly empowered, 
authoritative roles. This legitimacy lets them observe cities and the global middle 
class, articulate city visions and institutionalize them as global standards within a 
scientized global environment. Second, coupled with increasing professionalization is 
increased formal organizing of  city making, evidenced by the burgeoning of  
                                                   
14 There is a distinction between the global middle class lifestyle/consumer and professional roles 
– however, in a practical sense, the actual people who fall into this category overlap. Social roles 
are differentiated, in a theoretical sense, but people are always whole. There is a very close 
coupling between the two. For example, professionals are highly educated and enjoy 
consumption, and see their careers in terms of how they contribute to personal development. 




organizations, networks, initiatives in sharing urban best practices. Third, most of 
this formal organizing is increasingly regional, transnational and global in nature.  
4.1 The global middle class as professional experts 
The lay understanding of the middle class as being “white-collared” does not 
really say much about the significance of their role in modern society. I argue that the 
(global) middle class, if used in the sense of “white collar”, points to their role as 
professional experts. This requires that we go beyond seeing them simply as non-
physical labour intensive occupations. At the same time, the Marxist interpretation of 
the professions in terms of managers who coordinate production but do not own 
capital itself is also severely limiting (for example, Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979), 
as it does not take into account many other contemporary roles that are increasingly 
organized as professions today. Indeed, today, even the managerial role has been 
transformed into an increasingly expert role, indicated by the global expansion of 
business schools and proliferation of Master of Business Administration (MBA) 
programmes, standardization of management knowledge and the codification of such 
knowledge into fields such as management science (Moon and Wotipka 2006, 
Mendel 2006, Meyer 2002). What defines professions from other roles in society is 
their equipment with specialized knowledge, which is standardized and codified 
through disciplines and fields, and passed down in the form of certification and 
qualifications (Weber cited in Ritzer 1975:425). Furthermore, professionalization 
often develops with increasing bureaucratization. Weber himself  noted the tight 
coupling between the two when he wrote that “the bureaucratization of  all 
domination very strongly furthers the development of  „rational-matter-of-factness‟ 
and the personality type of  the professional expert (cited in Ritzer 1975:632). 
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Together, these two processes constitute different aspects of the historical process of 
rationalization (Ritzer 1975:632). 
While the implications of the rise of the professions and formal organizations 
have been discussed by many authors since Weber, one of the best attempts to 
forecast the impact of professionalization on society remains Daniel Bell (1973)‟s The 
Coming of Post-Industrial Society. For Bell, what he saw an emerging class of 
professionals and technical workers – which included teachers, healthcare workers, 
scientists and engineers, and government employees – were rapidly becoming a 
central occupational category. It is unfortunate that Bell wrote about the coming of 
post-industrial society, for this economistic emphasis has perhaps overshadowed a 
Weberian insight implied by Bell‟s argument. Bell notes the growing importance of 
theoretical knowledge with the expansion of the professional and technical class. Bell 
is also highly aware of the growth of non-economic, specialized organizations (he 
calls them non-profit). Bell thus arrives at a Weberian conclusion, that the rise of the 
professional and technical class – as purveyors of theoretical knowledge – is 
interlocked with the expansion of formal organizations in society. While 
organizations are not new, what makes the current era markedly different from 
previous of organizational expansion, is the rapid proliferation of specialized 
organizations beyond the military, the state, or corporations. In fact, the proliferation 
of formal organizations and penetration of formal organizing into all areas of social 
life is one key defining characteristic of the contemporary age (Meyer et al. 2006). 
What is so important about formal organizations and the professional experts that are 
typically employed at these organizations are “the universalized models they carry” 
(Drori 2008:449). In other words, formal organizations and the professions are the 
carriers of rationalization processes, spreading formal organizing into different 
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realms of society. I will illustrate this with examples when I discuss city making 
proper. 
Richard Florida‟s (2002) notion of the creative class, although couched in the 
language of creativity, does actually recognize of the expansion of professionalization 
in contemporary global society, and can be read as an extension of Bell‟s work. After 
all, the creative class comprises of scientists, engineers, architects, designers, 
educators, artists, musicians and entertainers, and a broader group of roles that 
includes “creative professionals in business and finance, law, health care and related 
fields” (Florida 2002:8, italics in original). Although his identification of the creative 
class seems vague and lacks occupational similarity – and perhaps even arbitrary– I 
suggest that is because professionalization is endemic in modern society. Meyer 
argues, for instance, that professional occupations, whose “authority commonly rests 
on their disinterested agency for general or universal principles, are the most rapidly 
growing ones in every society in the world” (Meyer 2010:7).  
On a more general level, the rise of professional experts and specialized 
organizations, as I will argue, is driving the process of globalization, and the 
formation of global cities as centres of these specialized organizations. Even more 
important to my discussion, the proliferation of professional experts and rationalized 
organizations contributes to the rationalization of city making, which organizes into 
a highly rationalized global field of social action. The continued expansion of  experts 
and professionals has a radical impact on city making, including the reconstitution of  
practices directly associated with urban inscription – such as architecture and urban 
planning – into increasingly formalized, organized and globalized fields.  
In the next section, I show the emergence of a global field of city making, 
which is itself underpinned by rationalized organizations and professions which focus 
on cities as their object of observation and solution proposition. There is greater 
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reflection about cities, the specification of  urban problems and the proposal of  
solutions by experts. Policy solutions and best practices are routinely shared through 
conferences, policy tours, reports and articles. Thus, concomitant with the increasing 
formal organization of city making is the universalization of models of urban 
development and regeneration, through what I call the scientization of city making. 
These practices create an institutional world of  cities in a global hierarchy of  cities, 
where cities can be ranked according to standardized criteria. The result is the rapid 
reordering of  city making into a highly rationalized, organized and globalized field.  
4.2 The scientization of city making 
Scientization, as a general concept, refers to the general expansion of  science 
in society, in a variety of  ways. This includes the quantitative expansion of  scientific 
organizations, as well as of  the number of  scientists trained and hired to fill research 
positions. From a longer term perspective, universities and scientific organizations 
and associations have expanded rapidly since the Second World War (Drori and 
Meyer 2006). Webometrics, an ongoing online project that maps and ranks world 
universities based on research output and web presence, has indexed over 20,000 
universities worldwide (Webometrics 2012). Some indicators go further, pointing to 
the massive growth in science in the last twenty to thirty years or so. If  we focus of  
scientific researchers (excluding social scientists), the number of  scientists increased 
from 5.8 million in 2002 to 7.2 million in 2007, a 25% increase within a span of  five 
years (UNESCO 2010:8).  
Beyond the quantitative expansion of  science, scientization also refers to the 
penetration of  science in more aspects of  social life, and is one of  the core vehicles of  
rationalization. It provides an image of  the world as orderly and understandable 
through standardized techniques (Drori and Meyer 2006). “Expansion in the volume 
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and scope of  science activities has meant a change in the logic of  operations in many 
parts of  society. Scientization becomes a general cultural form” (Drori and Meyer 
2006:53): 
Science assumes universality of patterns and thus derives law-like rules of 
regularity. In addition, scientific work is articulate and produces explicit 
scripts, formulae, models, and principles. The scientized scripts gain 
authority, derived from the faith in the scientific method, and thus can be 
applied and tested by others. One can see how this works, best, when it is 
applied without much actual data or analysis. We celebrate scientized scripts even 
when those are not more than awkward formulas of unquantifiable and untested data 
(Drori and Meyer 2006:57, my italics).  
 In this manner, science, or rather, scientized scripts becomes a generalized tool 
for understanding and making authoritative claims about society and then prescribing 
how positive change may be effected. As one indication of  this, the number of  think 
tanks – research organizations which bridge the gap between academic research and 
policy research, as well as the gap between civil society and state institutions in terms 
of  policy making – has massively increased globally since 1980: Between 1971 and 
1980, an average number of  60 new think tanks were set up every year. In the 
following period, from 1981 to 1990, the rate of  think tank expansion increased by 
50% to around 90 new think tanks per year. In the decade between 1991 to 2000, 
nearly 1200 think tanks were created (McGann 2007:5). By 2011, there were an 
estimated 6,545 think tanks operating in 182 countries. (McGann 2012:5) 
Science has also penetrated market and business oriented circles. For 
example, management consultancies have also seen a huge expansion and spread 
around the world, since their initial establishment in America in the early 1900s. 
According to one estimate, in 2007, the global management consultancy market was 
valued at $210 billion (Gross and Poor 2008). There are two competing arguments 
surrounding the origin of  management consultancy in America. The first argues that 
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the rise of  management consultancy in the United States was born out of  a fusion 
between engineering, law, and accounting, and the consultative practices of  merchant 
bankers at the beginning of  the twentieth century, the other contends that the growth 
of  management consultancy can be traced to the growth of  ideas about scientific 
management and Taylorism (cited in Gross and Poor 2008). Whatever the case may 
be, it is undeniable that consultancy today is highly scientized. Consultants and 
consultancies regularly produce strategy reports that often use proprietary 
methodologies, modeling strategies and even embark on their own data collection. 
They not only advise corporations, but also governments and non-profit 
organizations (Gross and Poor 2008). 
While there is no reliable data on exactly how many such organizations in the 
world specifically focus on urban issues, the broader trends of  the expansion of 
science gives us some rough indication of  the parameters for understanding the 
scientization of  city making. One indicator of  rationalization in the field of  city 
making is the growth of  research organizations that take the city as an object of 
study, if  not at least a point of  reference. These organizations may run the spectrum 
to purely “academic” ones, to those involved in policy advice or more commercially 
oriented ones, including universities, think tanks, consultancies, and so on. What they 
have in common is that they produce scientized understandings of  cities. 
One concrete example of  this is the standardization and universalization of  
city ranking indices, many of  which look at how “liveable” a city is, although in 
recent years, more sophisticated one – such as those attempting to measure the 
globality of  each city – have also proliferated. These lists are, like most institutions, 
not new, but they did reach a highly elaborate form by the 1980s. Rogerson (1999) 
argues – at least in the US context – that it was the publication of  the bestselling 
Places Rated Almanac that represented “the first serious attempt to popularize a 
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statistical ranking of  metropolitan areas and to do so on the basis o what has been 
termed „quality of  life‟ factors (Rogerson 1999:969-970). Since then, there has been a 
tremendous growth of  similar ranking efforts, and they have only grown more 
elaborate and sophisticated. Attempts to rank cities on a global scale in terms of  their 
liveability were initially popularized by magazines and editorials oriented towards 
globally-minded businessmen. As an example, global city rankings comparing the 
liveability of  cities from around the world were originally developed by management 
consultancy firms for the purpose of  advising their clients on how to compensate 
expatriates on overseas posting without compromising their quality of  life. This is the 
case with Mercer‟s Quality of  Life Reports and the Economist Intelligence Unit‟s 
Liveability Index:  
“The purpose of the Quality-of-Life Reports is to provide you with an 
objective, consistent and comprehensive evaluation of the relative differences 
in quality of living between any two cities. The Quality-of-Life Reports aim 
to overcome as many of the potential weaknesses of "traditional hardship" 
ratings as possible.” (Mercer 2002:1) 
The concept of liveability is simple: it assesses which locations around the 
world provide the best or the worst living conditions. Assessing liveability 
has a broad range of uses. The survey originated as a means of testing 
whether Human Resource Departments needed to assign a hardship 
allowance as part of expatriate relocation packages (EIU 2011:1). 
In addition, these reports are often written in an objective tone, relying on 
data and certain indicators, which may actually not be very complex. The Mercer 
Quality of  Life report also emphasizes the methodological rigour underpinning the 
report, in a way a social scientific article might discuss how certain concepts were 




Data for the reports was gathered using a questionnaire developed by Mercer 
Human Resource Consulting professionals around the world in close co-
operation with some of our major multinational clients and experts in the 
field. Each city was evaluated in terms of the 39 questions, on a scale from 0 
(lowest score) to 10 (highest score). A copy of the questionnaire is provided 
with each report. 
The first step in the service process was the data collection phase. Here, field 
researchers, along with consultants based in our network of offices 
worldwide, supplied the initial data, evaluations and comments for the 
reports. During a second phase, the data was reviewed and analyzed by 
regional centers. In the third and final phase of the process, the results of the 
data collection were compared and controlled by global analysts ensuring 
consistency among all of the cities surveyed (Mercer 2002:2) 
Here, the notion of  “scientized scripts” that Drori and Meyer (2006) describe 
is incredibly salient. Through the adoption of  scientific tools and methods, not only 
are discourses made more authoritative, they gain “a dramatic standardizing power: 
relying on their assumptions of  universal applicability, they are applied to very 
different contexts” (Drori and Meyer 2006:57). By measuring cities according to 
standardized and universalized criteria, city rankings become more abstract and 
highly diffusible to potentially all cities in the world, independent of  national or 
cultural origin. For example, Mercer Quality of  Living Reports‟ methodological 
approach is to “avoid the national and cultural differences and to compare factors, 
which are of  basic concern for all international employees” (Mercer 2002: 1-2, my 
italics). If  one examines the scale carefully, it is quite clear that consumer lifestyle 
practices associated with the global middle class are used as benchmarking criteria. 
Mercer‟s, for example, puts close to 10% weight on “recreation”, a criteria that 
measures the variety of  restaurants, theatrical and musical performances, cinemas, 
sport and leisure activities. Thus, a consumer lifestyle is specified in these 
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benchmarking criteria. The implication is that a liveable city is at least partly defined 
by how consumer-friendly it is. 
Although these reports originated from the field of  business and management 
consultancy, the global scale and extent of  such reports made them suitable for being 
developed and broadened into a more general way of  benchmarking cities. Today, 
Mercer‟s Quality of  Living Report has gone beyond providing human resource 
solutions to companies, having re-branded itself  as providing “international city 
benchmarking” (Mercer 2011). The Economist Intelligence Unit‟s Liveability Index 
has also taken the same strategy:   
The Quality-of-Living Reports cover approximately 200 major cities around 
the world. The flexibility of the reports ensures that each of these cities can 
be used as a base city and can be compared to any other city (Mercer 2002:2). 
While this function [assessing liveability of cities to compensate expatriates 
appropriately] is still a central potential use of the survey, it has also evolved 
as a broad means of benchmarking cities. This means that liveability is 
increasingly used by city councils, organisations or corporate entities looking 
to test their locations against others to see general areas where liveability can 
differ (EIU 2011:1). 
City ranking reports are not only produced by human resource consultancy 
firms providing advice to companies – they are also generated by more “serious” 
research think tanks and policy bodies. Beyond what may appear to be “pop” 
business categories, one finds a parallel mention in more academic categories, such as 
categories like alpha, beta and gamma cities, pioneered by Beaverstock et al. (1999). 
This initial approach has since evolved into the Globalization and World Cities 
Research Network, self-described as “the leading academic think tank on cities in 
globalization.” It has an ongoing project to comprehensively document and track 
global city status of  individual cities around the world (GaWC 2012).  
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In actual fact, the boundary between what is strictly academic and what is 
more action-oriented research is not always very clear. In fact, in some cases, it is not 
even possible to make such distinctions. For example, the Global Cities Index 
produced by Foreign Policy in 2008 was a product of  collaborative effort between 
consultancy firm A.T. Kearney and The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Besides 
the usual collection and analysis of  broad indicators, what was interesting was that 
the index also “tapped the brainpower of  such renowned cities experts as Saskia 
Sassen, Witold Rybczynski, Janet Abu-Lughod, and Peter Taylor” (Foreign Policy 
2008:70). The following ranking of  20 global cities, extracted from a bigger list of  60 
cities, shows how the cities are ranked according to five indicators of  business activity 
(number of  Fortune Global 500 firms headquartered there and volume of  trade of 
goods), human capital (how well city attracts diverse groups of  talent), information 
exchange (access to global news and information), cultural experience (diverse 
attractions for international residents and travellers), as well as political engagement 
(how a city influences global policymaking and dialogue) (Foreign Policy 2008:70; 




Table 4.21: The 2008 Global Cities Index 
Ranking City Dimension 











1 New York 1 1 4 3 2 
2 London 4 2 3 1 5 
3 Paris 3 11 1 2 4 
4 Tokyo 2 6 7 7 6 
5 Hong Kong 5 5 6 26 40 
6 Los Angeles 15 4 11 5 17 
7 Singapore 6 7 15 37 16 
8 Chicago 12 3 24 20 20 
9 Seoul 7 35 5 10 19 
10 Toronto 26 10 18 4 24 
11 Washington 35 17 10 14 1 
12 Beijing 9 22 28 19 7 
13 Brussels 19 34 2 32 3 
14 Madrid 14 18 9 24 33 
15 San Francisco 27 12 22 23 29 
16 Sydney 17 8 27 36 43 
17 Berlin 28 29 12 8 14 
18 Vienna 13 31 29 11 9 
19 Moscow 23 15 33 6 39 
20 Shanghai 8 25 42 35 18 
Source: Foreign Policy (2008:70; only top 20 cities shown) 
What is interesting about these five criteria used to measure city globality is 
that they all imply that a global city is constituted partly through the circulation of  
the global middle class. Measuring business activity by counting the number of 
Fortune Global 500 firms headquartered in a city, for instance, indirectly means that 
the city is resident to a large number of  professionals – who may or may not have 
been born there. The actual variables for how well a city attracts diverse groups of  
talent include the “size of  a city‟s immigrant population, the number of  international 
schools, and the percentage of  residents with university degrees” (Foreign Policy 
2008:70). The dimension of  information exchange measures “the number of 
international news bureaus, the amount of  international news in the leading local 
papers, and the number of  broadband subscribers” (Foreign Policy 2008:70). As for 
the criteria of  cultural experience, again, what the index measures is how diverse 
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entertainment options are for international residents and travellers. Finally, in the realm 
of  political engagement, what matters is how many “embassies, consultates, major 
think tanks, international organizations, sister city relationships, and political 
conferences a city hosts” (Foreign Policy 2008:70). A naturalized tautology that 
indicates institutionalization quickly becomes apparent: the globality of  cities is 
defined by the circulation of  the global middle class; global middle class urban 
experts define what global cities are. The consideration of  these aspects as 
representative of, or constitutive of  global city status indicates that global cites are 
being theorized as sites where members of  the global middle class circulate, either as 
professionals (who are global and mobile), or as travellers. Boschken (2003) tells us, 
using his own concept of  the upper middle class, that there is an  
unusually high percentage of upper middle class (UMC) living in global cities 
relative to nonglobal ones. This may seem logical to some. After all, as 
instrumental actors in molding an integrated global economy, the UMC 
contains those institutional professionals at the forefront of international 
awareness and experience. As a group with the most geographic mobility, its 
members seek out professional opportunities in cities having the richest 
supply of postindustrial employment (i.e., jobs centered on global 
information analysis, financial control, and symbolic creativity). Having been 
college educated, they have acquired not only the requisite scientific 
professional knowledge for such employment but also heightened tastes for 
multiculturalism and world-renowned cosmopolitan entertainment venues 
found mainly in global cities. (Boschken 2008:809) 
However, this does not mean that there is some sort of  conspiracy going on, 
where the upper middle class use underhanded political means influence policy 
makers. Rather, as I emphasized repeatedly throughout this work, the mechanism is 
far more symbolic and diffuse; the rationalized organizational environment 
“indirectly prescribes what symbolic and functional features a city should have and 
the policy outcomes policy makers should emphasize” (Boschken 2003:809). As I 
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discussed at length in the previous chapter, the global middle class is a constituted 
actor which becomes a major reference point for city making.  
Data on cities, of  course, are not limited to simple rankings of  cities that are 
published by consulting companies and business magazines. They are also collected 
in more complex forms by more technically oriented organizations and processed 
with sophisticated data processing technologies. Indeed, we have yet to document the 
long term impact of  the development and application of  computer technologies that 
are only beginning to transform the way data about cities and urban areas are 
collected. “Better technology has turned cities into fountains of  data that confirm known 
regularities and reveal striking new patterns” (The Economist 2012, my italics). While 
talk of  “the laws of  the city” in the same article may strike some social scientists as 
being overly positivistic and mechanistic, what is undeniable is that the dramatic 
advancement in urban research data collection is slowly contributing to the global 
standardization of  how cities are to be measured and understood. The collection of  
data and their compilation in statistical tables, reports and databases further allows 
the application of  more scientific techniques to understanding and making cities, 
resulting in a self-perpetuating institutional feedback mechanism. The same 
organizations that produce such reports often make their data available through 
institutional subscription, and thus, available to other experts working in similar fields. 
For instance, the UN-Habitat, which collects data about cities, routinely makes such 
data freely accessible to the public. Another initiative, the Global City Indicators 
Facility – originally sponsored by the World Bank – also reflects the trend towards the 
standarization of  indicators and methodologies for global city benchmarking (GCIF 
2012). 
In this way, in effect, city ranking, indicator, methodologies, and reports – 
whether they are created by academics or consultants – do not simply rank cities; 
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they actually create the representation of  the world as being made up with competing 
cities. Global city status, by implication, is an objective characteristic that can be 
measured and quantified according to standardized indicators, all of  which measure 
how global a city is. Phrased differently, the “narration” of  a city as global – as 
similar and connected to others in terms of  policy – is, then, materialized through the 
practices of  consultants and other experts of  truth” (McCann 2011:116). Thus, the 
scientization of  city making is a specific case of  the “great taxonomic powers” of 
science (Drori and Meyer 2006:65). By generating quantitative scales, rankings and 
categories of  cities, experts and expert discourses actually generate an institutional 
world where cities can become the most global city, the most liveable city, or the city 
with the most culture, the city with the best access to healthcare – as long as city 
makers take the appropriate policy measures.  In the institutionalist literature, this is 
referred to as theorization, which refers to “the self-conscious development and 
specification of  abstract categories and the formulation of  patterned relationships 
such as chains of  cause and effect” (Strand and Meyer 1993). Once formulated in 
abstract and universalized terms, such categories gain the ability to be applied to 
many different contexts. These authoritative categories are socially real entities insofar 
as they provide very general categories how city makers understand cities, urban 
development, and urban regeneration.  
In this sense, despite the discourse about urban competition, in fact, what 
characterizes contemporary urban development are the remarkably similar norms, 
models and institutional processes which undergird expert reflection about cities. 
Even if  planners and governments‟ focus on liveability might stem from the desire to 
attract multinational firms to set up in their cities, the logic of  this is not directly 
economic. It is also highly mediated by expert descriptions of  a globalizing world, 
embedded in universalized and highly scientized understandings of  cities. Not only 
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are city rankings an indicator of  city globality or liveability; it is implied that 
governments and planners themselves ought to act on the results of  such rankings 
(Giffinger et al. 2010). If  this can be referred to as “power”, it is certainly not power 
in the sense of  economic or political power that most of  extant literature makes it out 
to be. This power is not coercive, and is diffuse rather than hierarchical (Drori and 
Meyer 2005:67).  
Seen in this light, Richard Florida becomes less of  a unique case, but rather, 
as one case within a larger field of  urban discourse that observes and theorizes cities, 
identifies “urban problems”, and prescribes expert solutions, made possible within a 
scientized framework. What makes Florida quite exemplary is that he actually singles 
out the role of  agentic consumption and builds it into his model and theory of  urban 
regeneration. In fact, this notion has also been repeated in other rankings, such as the 
2008 Global Cities Index I presented above (in the categories of  human capital and 
cultural experience). Perhaps Florida‟s popularity lies in combining the newer and 
more contemporary individualist/consumption discourse to more old-fashioned 
productivity concerns that is so embedded in the discourse of  development, by stating 
that consumption of  by the creative class is not trivial because it enhances 
competitiveness. All of  these rationalization processes, however, needs to be 
understood in relation to formal organizing and global organizational networks 
which help to spread and institutionalize best practices at the global scale. 
4.3 From centralized urban planning to global urban governance  
The significance of  formal organizing and global networks in city making is 
highly salient in the examples I presented in the previous chapter. I showed that much 
of  the theorization of  urban models depended on global networks of academics, 
researchers, consultants, and similar experts. In this section, I want to shift the 
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discussion to that of  city planning and the related fields of  urban policy and 
architecture. City planning, as a practical field, affects the urban landscape in more 
direct ways than the activities I described in the previous section. Being more 
practical rather than theoretical activities, one might expect them to be more resistant 
to global organizing and be more sensitive to local conditions. For that reason, the 
significance of  global organizing in city making is best exemplified through city 
planning and related practical fields. The key point here is to show how even urban 
planning itself  has become a very specific form of  city making, and is being 
superseded by urban governance, which is a more inclusive kind of  city making, 
where the organizations are not simply state entities, and the experts involved go 
beyond those traditionally associated with urban planning and architecture, and 
include the professionals and experts who are not traditionally thought of  as having 
any direct role in shaping cities. 
Of  course, city projects and city planning – rationalized activities which 
sought to implement certain city visions onto the physical landscape have been 
around for a long time. Many scholars agree that there are historical antecedents to 
contemporary urban planning. In the broadest interpretation, examples of  attempts 
to plan and order cities come from ancient civilizations. In this sense, city planning 
has existed for as long as there have been cities. For the purpose of  the current 
discussion I will not refer to examples of  urban planning in ancient or classical 
civilizations, focusing on what can be referred to as modern urban planning 15 . 
Modern urban planning emerged in response to the Second Urban revolution, which 
                                                   
15 While I make a distinction between urban planning in the historical and classical civilizations 
and modern urban planning, I recognize that examples in the former were in fact very modernist 
in their spirit, because they went against tradition, and sought to imagine and improve upon urban 
life. In fact, classical Greek urban planning, for instance, was said to have inspired Le Corbusier, 
the father of modernist architecture and planning (Evans 2001:22). Nonetheless, there are still key 
differences, since the cities that the nineteenth century urban planners were dealing with were 
much more complex and populous than classical and medieval cities. 
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saw the explosion of  urban populations with the advent of  industrial technology 
(Hall et al. 2008:2). Contemporary urban planning, or more specifically – globalized 
urban governance – is a response to the Third Urban Revolution. 
For the purpose of  the current discussion, I present the following 
periodization in terms of  transformations in modern urban planning: pre-nineteenth 
century precursor to urban planning, 1890-1940s: the professionalization of  urban 
planning, 1940s-1970s: the nationalization of  urban planning, and 1980-today: 
globalized urban governance and city making. These are certainly disputable dates, 
and are not meant to be historically precise. Rather, they indicate identifiable turning 
points in the development of  modern urban planning. The first period can have said 
to have ended in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, and depending on perspective, 
can either be considered as a logical culmination of  tendencies towards 
rationalization of  urban thought and urban projects, or as a precursor to the 
emergence of  urban planning proper. Urban planning as a professional practice took 
shape in the 1890s-1920s, with the elaboration of general urban visions for resolving 
urban density and other problems associated with urbanization. The emergence of 
urban planning as a profession also coincided with the birth of  the modernist 
movement in architecture, as well as the increasing consolidation of  urban planning 
under the state. The post-war to 1970s period represented the zenith of  the 
nationalization and state-led centralization of  urban planning. However, this began to 
change in the 1980s, as state-led planning began to be dismantled, to be replaced by a 
far more diffuse global network of  diverse organizations, problematizing the notion 
of  urban planning itself. 
Most planning historians agree that precursors to modern urban planning 
blossomed in the Baroque during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as regal 
and papal power reached their heights (Hall and Twedwer-Jones 2011:12). Where 
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there was obvious urban design and planning rather than spontaneous urban growth, 
the result was expressed mainly in the form of  rectilinear streets. But there were also 
great architectural projects undertaken, such as the reconstruction of  Rome, or the 
development of  Bath into a spa town – which had up till then been a small medieval 
town (Hall and Twedwr-Jones 2011:12). Much of  this consisted of local town 
rationalizations, usually in the form of  monumental squares, were designed to 
express hierarchical power, either regal, aristocratic, or papal (Hall and Twedwr-
Jones 2011:12). The Haussmannization of  Paris represents the zenith of  this logic; on 
the other hand, it also marked the turning point of  the emergence of  modern, large 
scale urban planning. Georges-Eugène Hausmann was appointed Prefect of  the Seine 
by Emperor Napoelon in 1853. He was entrusted with considerable power, which he 
used to map and level the whole of  Paris. During his office he destroyed more than 
half  of  old Paris, creating “new streets through existing urban structures” (Hall 
1997b:71), and the wide boulevards and great parks Paris is famous for today. In this 
way, his work represented a logical culmination of  a tendency towards 
monumentality that had been present since the Baroque. 
By the second half  of  the nineteenth century, urban planning increasingly 
became constituted as a professional practice. Urban thinkers such as Ebenezer 
Howard and Le Corbusier emerged during this era, as they sought practical answers 
to the problem of  urban density. Of  course, this did not appear overnight; on the 
contrary, there had been, since the mid-nineteenth century, a “growing interested in 
urban improvement,” (Hall 1997b:47), no doubt a reaction towards urbanization and 
the massive increase in the urban population, and with it, the threat of  disease and 
congestion. Two traditions to urban planning – the Anglo-American, and the 
continental tradition to urban planning emerged. The Anglo-American tradition is 
best represented by Ebenezer Howard‟s thinking on the garden city, which advocated 
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decentralization (Hall and Twedwer-Jones 2011:28-31). In contrast, the continental 
tradition pursued centralization. Le Corbusier – ostensibly the best representative of 
the tradition – advocated increasing urban density through skyscrapers, at the same 
time creating wide urban space in between those buildings (Hall and Twedwer-Jones 
2011:49-52).  
Despite the stark differences in these two visions, they had many 
commonalities. The visions of  the pioneering planners were expressed as physical 
blueprints, as ideals to be realized in practice. Often, they presented little or no 
alternatives, and in doing so were able to institutionally monopolize planning and 
establish urban planning as a profession, with its own distinctive knowledge (Hall and 
Twedwer-Jones 2011:53-54). Their writings inspired countless urban thinkers, urban 
planners, and architects, and continue to do so today. Since they were physical 
planners, many of  their visions were intensely obsessed with physical form, and 
tended to see “the problems of  society and of  the economy in physical terms, with a 
physical or spatial solution in terms of  particularly arrangement of  bricks and mortar, 
steel and concrete on the ground” (Hall and Twedwer-Jones 2011:53).  
These pioneering ideas set the way for urban planning‟s gradual expansion 
terms of  theoretical elaboration, institutional monopoly, and control over physical 
space. The rationalizing tendencies in pioneering urban planning intensified with the 
development of  national-states, which saw planning increasingly become subsumed 
under public agencies. Urban planning generalized from the planning of  cities to the 
planning of  entire city regions and whole urban systems. Twentieth century urban 
planning reached its zenith in postwar 1950s and 1960s, as nation-states were formed 
all over the world. While modernism as an architectural movement – with its 
emphasis on minimal ornamentation and production of  homogenous forms – always 
had social equality as one of  its principles, this tendency was fully expressed as 
86 
  
planning became increasingly subordinated to the state. This came in the form of  a 
spatial Keynesianism in liberal, democratic states (Martin and Sunley cited in 
Brenner 2004:2). In the 1960s, many Western states set up 
relatively uniform, standardized administrative structures throughout their 
territories and mobilized redistributive spatial policies desgined to alleviate 
intra-national territorial inequalities by extending urban industrial growth 
into underdeveloped, peripheral regions. (Brenner 2004:2) 
In socialist contexts, state-led planning was even more extreme, since central 
planning regimes of  communist states reflected the priorities of  the state (Evans 
2001:32). Interesting, the increasing focus on function corresponded to a de-emphasis 
on physical form, which had been the focus for the pioneering planners. Planning 
increasingly became integrated with Keynesian policy concerns. The high point of  
twentieth century urban planning was the elaboration of  a functionalist bent and the 
parallel development of  functional zoning expressed in master plans. Thus, “city 
planning became increasingly more abstract, concerned with process and function, 
while its focus on physical form withered and died” (Boyer 1988:50). This trend 
reached a peak with the advent of computers and cybernetic modelling, when  
“city planners began to develop simulation models of urban development; 
most often related to transportation models based on location theories, which 
minimized the journey to work, or models of the real estate market used to 
predict which neighborhoods would likely decline and which would develop 
according to various public strategies, subsidies, and regulatory 
interventions” (Boyer 1988:50).  
State-centralized urban planning began to be undermined in the 1970s-1980s, 
giving way to Harvey‟s (1989) notion of urban entrepreneurialism. Central planning 
became increasingly undermined. States began to concentrate investment into the 
“the most competitive city-regions within their territories (Brenner 2004:2). The 
result was the establishment of new agencies at multiple scales, local, national, 
87 
  
regional, and global. Indeed, in contrast to twentieth century state-centred urban 
planning, contemporary city planning is organized globally, according to 
universalized and abstract norms and models, which I presented in the previous 
section. Unlike traditional urban planning, contemporary city planning is not 
centralized – and hence the term urban governance rather than urban government 
(Harvey 1989) – and city visions are not necessarily implemented in a hierarchical 
manner. Furthermore, city making is not reducible to the professional fields of  
architecture and urban planning, although these disciplines continue to play an 
important role in informing city making.  
As I have already alluded to in the previous section, much of  the 
rationalization of  city making parallels the expansion of  organizations and the 
creation of  global organizational links. Mercer‟s reports, for instance, are produced 
by researchers who are stationed in different cities all over the world. But beyond the 
examples of  more indirect forms of  city making I presented in the previous section 
that, recent studies have also stressed the the tendency for more obvious and direct 
city making – in particular, architecture and urban planning – to travel (Guggenheim 
& Söderström, 2010). While there are many ways for such models to diffuse – 
including direct imitating – such convergence is most obvious in spectacular 
architecture. This should not be surprising, since architects have always travelled. 
Today, a small number of  “starchitects” are responsible for designing many iconic 
buildings in many cities around the world (McNeill 2009).  
On one hand, modern architecture as a professionalized practice has 
historically been relatively global, even before the Second World War, with 
architectural movements often spreading over the world, carried by colonial practices 
and so on. The modernist movement pioneered by Le Corbusier, for instance, with its 
universalizing ambition of  “one building for all nations and all climates” represented 
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a high point of  architectural rationalization (Le Corbusier 1923, cited in Lang 
1994:155). Building forms such as the skyscraper, are ostensibly recognized globally 
as the symbol of  corporate capitalism, distinctively modern, and lacking any specific 
sort of  ethno-cultural reference (Grubbauer 2010). What characterizes the 
contemporary practice of  architecture is not that it has suddenly become globalized, 
but that travel has become a “routine aspect of  contemporary architectural practice” 
(McNeill 2009:1).  
Even so, it is only in recent decades that the portfolio and operations of  major 
architectural firms have become global, especially with the “emergence of  clients 
with transnational operations and a cosmopolitan sensibility” and (Knox 2007:72). 
The result is the emergence, since the 1990s, of  major architectural firms which 
pursue a global strategy, with “office networks that are international in scope” (Knox 
2007:74). Thus, beyond the institutionalization of  generalized city visions, specific 
spatial forms – such as architectural spectacles themselves, are in fact imitated in 
many cities. With the development of  communication technologies that make for 
rapid and effective dissemination of  information, architectural drawings, plans, 
photographs, and other visual representation of  buildings can be quickly transmitted, 
referenced, and reproduced in different cities around the world (Guggenheim and 
Söderström 2010:7). This partially accounts for the rapid diffusion of  spectacular 
forms across different cities, such as redeveloped waterfronts and observation wheels 
– both of  which often seem to go together. Furthermore, the engineering expertise 
that enables the construction of  these structures is itself  a product of  a globalized and 
mobile expert culture. The opening of  the London Eye in 2000 triggered the 
construction of  other observation wheels in other cities, including what is currently 
the world‟s tallest wheel, the Singapore flyer (Yap, forthcoming).  
89 
  
Formal organizing and the establishment of  organizational networks that 
enable city making are even more salient in the realm of  policy. For instance, 
González (2011) shows that Bilbao and Barcelona have become models for urban 
policy makers, and this has been facilitated through short trips – she uses the term 
“urban policy tourism” – taken by policy makers to the model cities. The scale of this 
sort of practice is hinted at by the figures – a staggering number of “almost 5000 
professionals visit these two cities every year to learn more about their regeneration” 
(González 2011:1413). What these two cases show is the point that model cities do 
not necessarily have to come from the Anglo-saxon “core”. The importance of such 
networks cannot be understated, and perhaps the notion of “network” imprecisely 
captures the institutional meaning of formal organizing and in city making. What the 
notion of network tries to point at is the transnational character of such organizations. 
For instance, many of these organizations are regional and are funded by multiple 
governments of different countries or cities, or even banks. The result is a growing list 
of non-government, non-profit organizations dedicated to the discussion and solving 
of urban issues and urban development. A good example is the Cities Development 
Initiative for Asia (CDIA), which is 
a regional initiative established in 2007 by the Asian Development Bank and 
the Government of Germany, with additional support of the governments of 
Sweden and Austria and the Shanghai People‟s Municipal Government. The 
Initiative provides assistance to medium-sized Asian cities to bridge the gap 
between their development plans and the implementation of their 
infrastructure investments. (CDIA 2011). 
By conducting research on urban issues, recommending solutions and even 
providing the funding to correct urban problems, organizations like CDIA promote a 
certain model of  urban modernity. Much like the programmes of  development 
launched by transnational organizations in the name of  an abstract and universal 
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notion of  linear development in the wake of  modernization theory, these initiatives 
are both a reflection of  the institutionalization of  city visions, and the very agent of 
institutionalization. Closer to my discussion and focus on notions of  liveability and 
envision of  cities of  the future around the global middle class, however, is given in the 
example of  the New Cities Foundation,   
a non-profit Swiss institution dedicated to improving the quality of life and 
work in the 21st-century global city, with a particular focus on new cities in Asia, 
the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. NCF sees cities as humanity‟s 
most important source of innovation, creativity and wealth-creation. We 
believe that achieving the vision of building more sustainable and dynamic 
urban communities can only be done through innovative partnership. NCF 
serves a unique role in developing new models of collaboration between the 
public, private and academic sectors (New Cities Foundation 2012a). 
The New Cities Foundation is another good example of  the importance and 
salient of  inter-organizational networks in city making, since it was founded by 
corporations such as General Electric, CISCO and Ericsson. While many member 
organizations are corporations, others include academic and other non-profit 
organizations (New Cities Foundation 2012b). In addition to the emergence of these 
formal city making organizations, there is a growing list of conferences, summits and 
other similar platforms where urban planners, policy makers, academics, consultants 
and other experts meet to share data and best practices from cities around the world. 
For example, the New Cities Foundation organized the inaugural New Cities summit 
in May 2012, held in Paris. The annual event is supposed to bring together 
700 global thought leaders in technology, infrastructure, architecture, energy, 
transport, national and local government, the media, academia as well as the 
non-profit sector. Content-rich keynotes and plenaries form the basis for 
discussion about how we will live, work and play in the cities of tomorrow. (New 
Cities Foundation 2012c) 
The World Cities Summit, the first of which was organized in 2008, is 
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the global platform for government leaders and industry experts to address 
liveable and sustainable city challenges, share innovative urban projects and 
forge partnerships. Held in conjunction with the 5th Singapore International 
Water Week (SIWW) and the inaugural CleanEnviro Summit Singapore, the 
World Cities Summit 2012 will enable delegates to network with an even 
wider group of public and private sector players and discover synergies 
between urban planning, water and environmental solutions. (World Cities 
Summit 2012, my italics) 
The proliferation of  such events reflects the increasing institutionalization of  
city making as a routine practice. In these conferences and events, city visions are 
discussed, articulated and defined by experts. Furthermore, these networks of  city 
making, once established, further the rationalization of  city making by elaborating 
more norms, visions and models for urban development and planning. Many city 
visions are institutionalized in the programs of  international organizations, such as 
the United Nations and its many derivative arms. For instance, the formation of  the 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat) is a reflection of  formal 
organizing to deal with massive urbanization. As a transnational policy organization, 
many of  the policies, research programmes promulgated by the UN Habitat reflect 
the institutionalization of  abstract norms at the global level. UN Habitat also has a 
journal, Habitat International, through which research about urban development is 
consolidated. As further evidence of  how seriously UN Habitat takes its mission of 
urban development, it is instructive that UN Habitat has established awards to 
recognize best practices in urban planning and policy (Campbell 2009). 
The consequence of  all these processes is a world filled with formal 
organizations and the formal organizing of  city making. These organizational actors 
are empowered with the authority to define general city visions and to set goals for 
cities. Many such organizations transcend locality. The result is a growing awareness 
that cities are not simply spaces where things occur; they are literally represented as 
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OBSERVING CITY MAKERS AND CITY VISIONS 
5.1 Observing global cities as sites of circulation of the global middle class 
I started off  by claiming in Chapter One that contemporary city visions and urban 
models of  regeneration and planning are increasingly organized around ideas about 
lifestyle, entertainment, and consumption. Reviewing the literature in Chapter Two, I 
found that most of  the existing literature tended to operate from a political economy 
framework. These literature tried to identify the actors who were responsible for 
urban change, and there were a variety of  answers – ranging from middle class 
individuals, real estate developers, capitalists, and even governments and states. 
Despite their very different ideological origins, and different production or 
consumption emphases, both accounts are fairly compatible, since they both stem 
from a predominantly economically driven understanding of  society. These two 
accounts have been synthesized by many scholars into a political economic theory of 
city making, where the massive transformations in cities happened because “capital 
turned to the creation of  specially designed environments [for the consumption] of 
the new professional classes” (Boyer 1988:55). 
I suggested that an institutionalist approach to city making would help urban 
researchers generate a more sophisticated of  these observed urban changes. More 
specifically, much of  the urban transformations we observed can be attributed to the 
emergence of  the global middle class as major reference point for city making. After a 
brief  review of  the significance of  the middle class in social theory in Chapter Three, 
I emphasized its global character and specified two aspects that make the global 
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middle class central to the process of  city making. The first of  these, the 
lifestyle/consumer aspect, refers to an institutionalized demand for certain kinds of  
urban experiences as, for instance, specified and observed in lifestyle magazines, 
marketing discourses, and so on. This means that the existence of  institutionalized 
demand is also partly dependent on the observers of  the global middle class – cultural 
intermediaries and other professional experts.  
The second aspect of  the relationship between the global middle class and 
contemporary city making refers to the latter's constitution as a highly rationalized, 
formally organized, and global activity concerned with the observation of  cities, and 
the elaboration of  communication about the meaning of  (globally modern) cities. Its 
main agents are diverse formal organizations and the global middle class professional 
experts – not just architects and urban planners, but also, policy makers, scientists, 
consultants, think tank researchers, journalists, and so on. Their legitimacy does not 
stem from imperial power – as was the case of  Hausmann, who was entrusted by 
Napoleon Bonaparte essentially free reign to reshape Paris as he saw fit. Rather, their 
symbolic legitimacy is derived from a highly rationalized cultural environment, and 
although not necessarily “scientific” in the conventional sense of  the term, is 
definitely scientized, highly professionalized, and organized around expert cultures. 
City visions today are increasingly articulated via expert knowledges, and then 
institutionalized through a global field of  city making, legitimized through scientized 
scripts that hold universal relevance. Within the field of  city making, cities are 
observed as abstract entities, and cities which approximate some sort of  idealized city 
are used as actual models for other cities to aspire towards. While New York, Tokyo, 
or London have traditionally been viewed as the quintessential globally modern 
cities, this is no longer the case, with the emergence of  other cities around the world 
which satisfy the abstract benchmarks that have been elaborated by these urban 
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experts. As such, model cities can be located in any part of  the world, and city 
makers in different cities look to other cities for reference.  
In Chapter Four, I made the claim the benchmarks used to rank cities are so 
universalized and abstract to begin with, that urban models need not even be actually 
existing cities. In that sense, global cities or liveable cities are more theoretical 
categories than existing empirical referents. I showed that most indicators in expert 
discourses imagine global cities as sites of  circulation of  the global middle class, and 
liveable cities are defined according to the lifestyle requirements of  the global middle 
class.  The criteria used to define the globality and liveability of  cities is often based 
on the institutionalized demand represented by the lifestyle practices of  the global 
middle class. I also emphasized that the main mechanism behind urban change is 
institutional “soft” power – which is normative and cognitive, rather than coercive. 
Urban transformation along consumerist lines is phenomenological and symbolic, 
rather than being the outcome of  a conspiracy where elites simply impose their 
visions on cities through economic and political force. 
I want to conclude the discussion here with an illustration that encapsulates 
and summarizes the discussion of  the two roles of  the global middle class in city 
making. Monocle, a magazine that carries the self-description of  being “a global 
briefing covering international affairs, business, culture and design,” has been ranking 
cities around the world since it was launched in 2007. It emphasizes that its rankings 
have “not been developed as a guide for ex-pats looking for their next plumy posting. 
Rather, it has been created to identify the cities that put its residents [sic] happiness 
and well-being first” (Monocle 2008a:18). Beyond city liveability rankings – which 
are only published once a year – the magazine reports on global trends in consumer 
goods, services, design, and so on. This makes it is clear that the magazine is oriented 
towards globally minded, active individuals – and who are not necessarily expatriates, 
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but active, fun, and spontaneous creative individuals who are likely to identify with 
the global middle class identity. Furthermore, the magazine also discusses urban 
projects and visions in different cities around the world, publishes interviews with 
city mayors and leaders, and showcase cities and communities that have “got it 
right”. As a further illustration, thinkers such as Richard Florida have been invited to 
contribute articles on urbanism in its pages (for example, Monocle 2008b:59). The 
magazine is published from London, and has bureaus in New York, Zurich, Tokyo 
and Hong Kong. It is put together by journalists, photographers, artists, designers, 
and has 16 foreign correspondents based in cities around the world. In a rather direct 
sense, then, it is prepared by the global middle class experts, for the global middle 
class consumer in mind.  
5.2 Institutionalism and the city making approach in urban studies 
Throughout the present work, I constantly referred to the conceptual approach taken 
by the present work as institutionalism. To be more specific, it is a phenomenological, 
constructivist version of  institutionalism that treats all social entities, including actors 
themselves and the attribution of  agency, as socially constructed, and thus – in the 
broadest sense – institutional. In terms of  city making, the emphasis was on the 
proliferation of  diverse organizational actors, following multiple goals. What gives a 
measure of  coherence to the overall activity of  city making, I suggested, is the global 
middle class which serves both as the basis of  professionalized and rationalized 
expert knowledges that legitimize city making, as well as the reference point for 
formulating city making goals and visions.    
In contemporary discourse, there is a growing tendency to portray cities as 
actors (Taylor 2004:56), much like how nation-states, organizations, and individuals 
were constituted as actors in over the course of  the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
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(Meyer and Jepperson 2000, Meyer 2010). Cities are “competitors” trying to attract 
capital; they “participate” in initiatives and “learn” from each other; they can “fail”, 
or “succeed” by “reinventing” themselves. It is quite significant that cities are 
increasingly portrayed as actors at the juncture that the locus of  city making is 
shifting away from centralized state power to one that is increasingly diffuse, 
decentralized, and difficult to pin down – a “globalizing urban governmentality” 
(Robinson 2011). Cities, if  they can be said to act, do not do so through solely 
through municipal governments. Rather, city action is the outcome of  multiple 
organizational actors, it is the product of  “urban assemblages” (McCann and Ward 
2011). In this ironic sense, city making, as a global field, also supplies its own 
“organizational myths” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) to mask its own operation.  The 
notion, therefore, that cities can actively portray themselves as exciting places of 
lifestyle in order to attract talented individuals who can then contribute to economic 
growth of  that city, is also one major meta-narrative which mask the operations of 
city making in the contemporary age.  
The institutionalist city making perspective observes and analyses this account 
as a product of  historical social construction. Here, the institutionalist city making 
perspective shares an affinity with realist political economy approaches in that both 
see such narratives as problematic, rather than accepting them uncritically as real 
descriptions of  society and urban change. However, the key difference is this: in the 
political economy approach, economic (and sometimes political) elites are promoting 
these myths in order to drive global capitalism; in contrast to that, in the 
institutionalist account, there is no economic base, and city making is rarely simply 
an outcome of  pure economic or capitalist intentions: 
This institutionalist emphasis on rationalization turns the discourse of 
rationality on its head: it regards action and its formal justifications (in policy 
and other statements), which are often taken by realists to be prima facie 
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evidence of deliberated and rationally calculated intention, as scripts of 
purposive and instrumentalized intention that carry symbolic, ritualized, and 
ceremonial importance. (Drori 2008:452) 
What are some of  the advantages of  the institutionalist approach to city 
making? First of  all, it problematizes the belief  that cities are primarily shaped by 
economic processes and actors. This is not to say that capitalists and states are not 
important actors in the process, or that investment in built urban environments is not 
driven by economic considerations – they are. However, it is hard to see how 
economic processes and actors could possibly work except within the global field of  
city making co-constructed by diverse organizational actors and the experts who are 
involved in rationalization activities. Without media reporting on middle class 
gentrification, or the identification of  a viable global middle class consumer market 
through market studies, it is unlikely that real estate developers would ever risk 
millions of  dollars of  capital in risky investments. Without consultants to prescribe 
creative city strategies to municipal governments, or the organizational networks 
formed between city makers, it is difficult to imagine how urban regeneration 
strategies would quickly become so similar all over the world. 
The second benefit is to see the process of  diffusion and adoption of the 
global middle class as a reference point for diverse, yet somewhat isomorphic 
organizations. Thus, even economic actors are embedded within a larger environment 
of  city making, populated by diverse organizational and constituted actors, 
empowered by rationalized models of  urban development and expectations of  cities 
and their potential users. Despite the diversity of  organizations, the process of 
diffusion and adoption of  the global middle class as a common reference point serves 
to give a degree of  coherence to city making. The third advantage of  the 
institutionalist approach is that it is a reflexive framework capable of  second order 
observation and self-observation. Put crudely, political economy perspectives focus 
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on the ways that corporations and states actively shape cities. The institutionalist 
perspective attempts to go beyond economic and political actors, and looks at how 
city making is constituted via the global middle class: global middle class experts 
observe the global middle class consumer lifestyle. While realist perspectives sees 
reification of  cities as actors as a methodological problem, the institutionalist 
approach sees that as a verification of  its own descriptions. Finally, the institutionalist 
approach recognizes that the possibility of  its own observation is also contingent; that 
this thesis is itself  an expert discourse on cities, made possible with the expansion of 
universities and the growth of  the legitimacy of  urban research.  
In summary, I believe that this work‟s focus on the centrality of  city visions 
revolving around consumption, leisure and lifestyle in city making demonstrates the 
viability of  an intuitionalist approach to city making and urban studies more 
generally. There are quite a few directions for further research that such an approach 
suggests. For one, building a more general theory of  city making would require 
identifying major city makers in other periods of  history, and how city making 
changed according to institutional environments and historical contexts. Second, the 
definition of  the global middle class, which in the current work was limited to 
lifestyle/consumer and the professional expert roles, can be further expanded. There 
are other roles of  the middle class that have a long history in sociology, especially as 
champions of  democracy and supporters of  democratic movements. Could the 
members of  the contemporary global middle class generate movements that directly 
affect cities on the political level? And if  so, what organizational form would such 
movements adopt? Finally, while the notion of  a professional expert role gives us a 
general purchase on the role of  global middle class in city making, it might be also 
too general to guide more detailed empirical investigation of  city making and city 
makers. Researchers undertaking studies of  the latter sort would want to examine 
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and compare different types of  city makers and their organizational capacities. How 
is the city making role of  media organizations and journalists, for instance, different 
from the city making role of  an urban economic commission filled with ranks of  
transport economists? These are surely interesting questions to consider.  
Finally, I want to end with a note of  caution regarding global city visions. 
City making is a complex and heterogeneous field that is populated by diverse actors 
with divergent interests, and thus the notion of  global middle class does not imply 
that all cities in the world will inevitably converge toward the same form. Rather, the 
idea of  the global city, based in global middle class lifestyle and consumption, has 
become a global reference point for all cities in the world. City makers can choose to 
disagree with this vision, but they cannot avoid it. It is in this sense that we can speak 
of  the consumer and lifestyle global city as an institutional project of  global 
modernity (Wittrock 2000). The next step for urban research would be to examine 
the relationship between this project and other emerging city visions that have gained 
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